An Cosantóir

www.military.ie THE DEFENCE FORCES MAGAZINE | 15 possible way. Definite lists of such persons in the area of his command shall be retained by each Battalion and Brigade Commander.' With the introduction by the British administration in Ireland of the Black and Tans in 1920, and the Auxiliaries by 1921, the conflict entered into a more deadly and violent phase. The development of IRA flying columns was very much a local initiative with local units in the southwest taking the lead, though an example of with their success, IRA GHQ supporting these endeavours. Overall however, the relationship that Mulcahy had with IRA figures in the conflict 'hotspots' such as Cork was rather mixed as the conflict ended. The overriding criti- cism that emerges in many retrospective accounts is the lack of supply of arms direct from GHQ, Mulcahy instead encouraging frequent arms raids on barracks. Indeed, one (unnamed) southern IRA leader is said to have remarked the conflict began with the Volunteers using hurleys and will end with them using fountain pens, as per Mulcahy's frequent request for reports. Tom Barry, writing in Guerilla Days in Ireland, insisted both Mulcahy and Collins should have attempted to visit IRA units in the areas of heavy fighting during the conflict. Though technically the overseeing body of the Irish Re- publican Army, it may seem surprising that the staff of IRA GHQ had little involvement in negotiating the terms of the truce – though they had influence as to the terms they as the governing body of the IRA could accept. Eamon Duggan and Robert Barton, both commandants, represented the IRA in the truce negotiations. Two reasons for IRA GHQ's lack of involvement in the truce negotiations was 1) the continued refusal of the British to recognise the IRA as a le- gitimate army and 2) the likely fear on the part of the Sinn Féin politicians for the IRA leadership to be out in the open if the conflict were to continue. As Mulcahy later comment- ed: "It may seem funny to think that the discussion which to led to an agreement to have a Truce was conducted, as far as the Irish side was concerned, entirely at the political level, although it was with Macready, who was the general officer commanding the British troops in Ireland... I was told by Cathal Brugha it wasn't necessary for me to attend (we may have been kept 'under cover'.)." Mulcahy nonetheless was unsure how long the truce was to last, and many IRA figures were left with the impression that GHQ were to take advantage of the truce period for "breathing room", i.e. training and re-armament. The day after the truce, Mi- chael Brennan, an IRA commandant in Clare, visited Dublin. Given an account of his interaction which GHQ, Brennan said: "I... reported to GHQ. Collins, Mulcahy, Gearóid O'Sullivan and oth- ers all emphasised that they didn't expect the Truce to last very long and that it must be used to improve our organisation and training. I left them quite convinced that we had only got a breathing space and that a resumption of the fighting was an absolute certainty." Though no one on the IRA GHQ staff then realised it, the truce of course marked the end of what its newspaper often proudly referred as the War of Independence. For the men of the IRA GHQ staff however, a different conflict loomed in the near future. All who are depicted in Leo Whelan's famous painting of the IRA GHQ staff in mid-1921 (see pictured) were to play pivotal roles in the uncertain period leading to the Civil War – in which Mulcahy and GHQ were central as ructions engulfed the revolutionary movement over the Anglo-Irish Treaty. The next phase of conflict was to see an enhanced military role for Mulcahy in the new National Army of the Irish Free State, a result of his success as IRA Chief of Staff from 1919-21. Ultimately, it was this later period of military command that was to have a more substantial effect on his political legacy. About the Author: Gerard Shannon is a historian resid- ing in the town of Skerries in north county Dublin. He has published a number of articles online and in print about figures in the Irish revolutionary movement of the early 20th century. He is studying an MA in History at DCU, and is in the process of finishing a thesis on Liam Lynch as the anti-Treaty IRA Chief-of-Staff during the Civil War. Richard Mulcahy Richard Mulcahy in his uniform as Commander-in-Chief of the National Army, which he commanded from 1922 - 24.

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