An Cosantóir

www.military.ie THE DEFENCE FORCES MAGAZINE | 45 thus leaving the only copies of income tax records in one place; the Custom House. So it was not a matter of if the Custom House was to be attacked, but when. That moment came in December 1920 on Éamon de Valera's return from his fundraising tour in America. Having been away for most of the conflict he had seen how the international media was portraying events in Ireland. He wanted the IRA to move away from ambushes and assas- sinations, as he felt that in propaganda terms they were not casting the Irish in a favourable light. He favoured large- scale actions, showing the IRA as the legitimate army of the legitimate government of the Irish Republic. In early 1921 a meeting of the Army Council was held at which de Valera put forward his plans. Oscar Traynor, now OC Dublin Brigade, recalled: … He [De Valera] made it clear that something in the nature of a big action in Dublin was necessary in order to bring public opinion abroad to bear on the question of Ireland's case. De Valera suggested two possible targets: Beggars Bush Barracks, the Auxiliaries' HQ; or the Custom House, 'the administrative heart of the British Civil Service machine in this country.' After gathering intelligence on both targets, Traynor sug- gested that they should attack the Custom House, which held all local government records, including all tax files for Ireland. If the operation was a success 'its destruction would reduce the most important branch of British Civil Govern- ment in Ireland to virtual impotence and would, in addition, inflict on her a financial loss of about two million pounds.' Three months' planning followed, involving sections of all battalions of the Dublin Brigade. Surveillance of the target proved easy. Carrying official-looking envelopes, Traynor himself was able to walk freely around the Custom House. Liam O'Doherty, OC 5th Battalion (Engineers) obtained plans of the building from a friendly contact in the Board of Works. A number of IRA men also worked as clerks in the Custom House and provided intelligence. One of these, Harry Colley, observed that for the opera- tion to be any way successful, they needed to destroy the Will Room, on the ground floor in the middle of the build- ing, under the dome. Colley believed '…that this was the only combustible part of the building capable of forming a large fire; and with the dome overhead, to act as a chimney, might make it possible to burn the whole building.' Tom Ennis, OC 2nd Battalion, was in charge of the opera- tion as his battalion would be carrying out the assault, with men from the other battalions on the periphery giving pro- tective cover. It was estimated that at least 120 men would be needed for the attack. (New research indicates, however, that close to 300 men took part in the overall operation.) Each man would have six rounds of ammunition. The op- eration was to last 25 minutes. Collins was not happy with the risk of losing so many men, but de Valera's response was, '…if these 120 men were lost and the job accomplished, the sacrifice would be well justified.' With plans finally agreed, the date was set for 25th May. Equipment gathered for the operation included 280 tins of paraffin oil and petrol, bales of cotton waste, hatchets, bolt cutters, and transport. Dublin Fire Brigade, whose members included both IRA and ICA, provided information on the best way to burn such a large building. On the morning of the 25th those involved in the opera- tion met at specified locations around the Custom House, predominantly Beresford Place, Strand Street and Lower Gardiner Street. There, they were fully briefed on the opera- tion and given their tasks. Tom Ennis and members of 2nd Battalion, along with some members of the Squad, entered the building at 12.55pm carrying tins of paraffin. The other battalions and the Active Service Unit (ASU) took up positions in the surrounding area and occupied fire stations around the city. As the Volunteers entered the building, members of 5th Battalion cut tele- phone communications from the Custom House. Once inside the building the Volunteers began to gather the staff and bring them to the Central Hall under the su- pervision of the ASU and the Squad. Once the rooms were cleared and prepared, Tom Ennis was to use a whistle blast to signal that they were to be set on fire. Two whistle blasts would indicate completion of the job and the evacuation of the men. Custom House staff were taken completely by surprise, Custom House in flames 25th May 1921 Volunteers captured after the Custom House attack

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