An Cosantóir

An Cosantóir March 2019 www.dfmagazine.ie 20 | MICHAEL COLLINS BY JOSEPH EA CONNELL JNR I n 1917 national coordination of the IRA began in earnest when a national executive was elected, with Cathal Brugha as chairman, Michael Collins as director of army organisa- tion, and Richard Mulcahy in charge of training. Although the executive functioned to 1920, by March 1919 real power over the army had passed to the GHQ Staff and then to the Ministry for Defence when Dáil Éireann was proclaimed in January 1919. This left Collins and Mulcahy in effective command of the army and intelligence throughout the War of Independence. From 1919 to the end of 1921, the war was waged with strong reliance on intelligence, propaganda, politics, and guerrilla tactics, coordinated in Dublin by Collins. Primarily the war was fought on a number of fronts; between the British Secret Service and Col- lins's network in Dublin, a similar war led by Florence O'Donoghue in Cork, a war of harassment and reprisal in the country, and a war of propaganda. Collins's intelligence ring and ruthlessly-used killers were the lynchpin of the effort in Dublin, and he also sent directives across the country coordinating efforts in almost every field. Collins recognised that guerrilla warfare was the only way forward, although this took a different character in the country to what was employed in Dublin. In the country, initially, groups assembled at night to carry out attacks on RIC barracks before re- suming their ordinary civilian lives the next day. Later, small flying columns were formed that remained on full-time active service in the country, receiving shelter and food from locals, getting assistance from local IRA men and civilians in their activities, and operating hit-and-run tactics. In Dublin Collins's prime targets for assassination were the G- men, who specialised in political work, as their elimination would remove a vital source of intelligence from the British, allowing the IRA vital breathing space. Collins believed: "England could always reinforce her army. She could replace every soldier that she lost... But there were others indispensable for her purposes that were not so easily replaced. …To paralyse the British machine, it was neces- sary to strike at individuals. Without her spies, England was help- less. It was only by their accumulated and accumulating knowledge that the British machine could operate." Although he knowingly embarked upon his ruthless path, Col- lins was aware of a possible public backlash. However, the knee- jerk reaction of suppression and censorship from Dublin Castle in response to his policy, together with the obvious alarm caused by the killings, confirmed to Collins that he was hurting the British intelligence system. By the end of Collins's brutal but effective campaign, the DMP's intelligence-gathering capabilities were destroyed. The force was on the verge of collapse, compelled to withdraw from direct involvement in the conflict; its members refusing to carry arms or assume any responsibility for a political crime. Throughout the war, Collins deliberately provoked the au- thorities into over-reacting in ways that alienated the over- whelming majority of the Irish people and much of the IRA's popularity was due to the excessive reaction of British forces to insurgent activity. For most of 1919 and into 1920 the level of violence throughout Ireland increased, and various quasi-official bodies like the Dáil/ Republican Courts or the IRA began to hold sway throughout the countryside. The IRA benefited from widespread support from the general population, who regularly refused to pass information to the British. Shaping a Revolution Shaping a Revolution Shaping a Revolution Shaping a Revolution Members of the Irish delegation at the signing of the Treaty for the Irish Free State, 1921. Harry Boland, Michael Collins and Eamon de Valera three survivors of the Easter Rising between sessions of Dáil Éireann, circa 1st April 1919.

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