An Cosantóir the official magazine of the Irish Defence Forces and Reserve Defence Forces.
Issue link: https://digital.jmpublishing.ie/i/1087190
www.military.ie THE DEFENCE FORCES MAGAZINE | 25 age of an alleged British spy shot by the IRA and dumped on the roadside with a label reading "SPY" and, with no small degree of hypocrisy, denounced such methods as the criminal acts of an Irish "murder gang". The majority of those killed by the IRA as spies were shot and their bodies were deposited in public places with a "spy notice" affixed to their corpse as a warning to others. The labelling of the corpse took extra effort on the part of the killers and was an attempt at show- ing proper bureaucratic and judicial processes to the public. Michael Collins, the IRA's Director of Intelligence stated that "There is no crime in detecting and destroying in wartime the spy and the informer" and he claimed that the IRA had adhered to the rules of war "…as far as possible". Although there is little evidence to support the allegations of sectarianism levelled against the IRA that is not to say that its conduct in the intelligence war was always exemplary. Beginning in May of 1920 IRA Headquarters began issuing a series of "General Orders" in an attempt to guide and regulate the military conduct of the IRA in relation to the execution of spies and other military tactics. Officially, the death sentences passed on all alleged spies had to be approved by the local IRA Brigade Com- mandant and reported to the Adjutant General of the IRA. The reality however is that lower ranking IRA officers often sanctioned executions without waiting for formal approval. Only IRA Headquarters had the authority to pass sentence of death on members of the IRA found guilty of spying – but at least three serving IRA Volunteers were executed as spies most of whom were killed without the sanc- tion of IRA Headquarters. One of these was Patrick Larmour an IRA Volunteer from Monaghan who simply 'broke' under interrogation. After release from custody, Larmour told his superior of- ficers exactly what had happened, and although it is unlikely that he gave the British forces any significant informa- tion; he was shot as a spy. James Dalton an IRA officer in Limerick city accused of spying was actually shot as the result of an internal IRA feud. The allegation that Dalton was a spy was undoubtedly concocted after the killing, and, a short time later Dáil Éireann took the unprec- edented step of investigating Dalton's death and issuing a public statement declaring his innocence. Another General Order stated that women found guilty of spying were to be exiled from Ireland however local IRA commanders often took more extreme measures. Some women accused of col- laborating with the British were publicly humiliated by having their heads shaved (a tactic later adopted by the French Resistance) and the IRA executed at least three female suspects accused of spying. By far the most infamous of these cases was the shooting of Ma- ria Lyndsay. Lindsay was abducted by the IRA in March 1921 because she had informed the British Army about an IRA ambush at Dripsey, County Cork resulting in the capture and execution of five IRA Volunteers. Maria Lyndsey was one of about forty suspected spies whose body was hidden by the IRA after execution. During the conflict both, the British forces and the IRA "disappeared" a small number of those they killed. In the case of the IRA, the practice may have been adopted in circumstances where republicans felt that the killing would not be approved of by the wider community - such as the shooting of a woman. Alternatively, "disappearances" may merely have been a way to hide evidence of these killings. Either way the fact that the IRA used this tactic is one reason why the intelligence war remains controversial. The main reason why the IRA's intelligence war will always remain a contested history and controversial subject is because in most cases it is simply impossible for modern day historians to establish beyond any doubt the guilt or innocence of those executed by the IRA. The British Gov- ernment has a longstanding policy of neither confirming nor denying if civil- ians shot as alleged spies and inform- ers were in fact intelligence agents. As recently as 2015 the British Home Of fice refused a freedom of informa- tion request about financial payments to Irish informants a century earlier on the basis that "to do so would un- dermine British national security and could lead to present day informants being less willing to come forward in case their names were revealed in 100 years time." The challenge for historians in the "De- cade of Centenaries" is to scrutinise all of the available evidence about the IRA's intelligence war, evaluate it fairly and to publish it educating the public and getting them to ask difficult questions about our history. In assessing the IRA's record in executing civilians for spying, the available evidence shows that whilst local republican units did not always have a perfect record in intelligence matters – there is little evidence to sup- port the suggestions that "ethnic cleans- ing" and widespread anti-Protestant sectarianism blighted the IRA's military record in the War of Independence. About the author: Pádraig Óg Ó Ruairc has a PhD in history and has written several books on the 1916 Rising, War of Independence and Civil War. The data used in this article come from his book 'Truce: Murder, Myth and the Last Days of the Irish War of Independence'. Short Shrift for Spies. Photo: Authors Collection