An Cosantóir

An Cosantóir October 2019 www.dfmagazine.ie 20 | Peacekeeping on the Edge OGL and the 2006 War (part 2) BY COMDT KEVIN MCDONALD (RET'D) A ll patrol bases (PBs) received 'firings close' during the war but PB Khiam seemed to be getting the brunt of them, especially in the days leading up to July 25. Concern had been growing about the volume of not only artillery strikes but also aerial bombs landing close to the base; a concern transmitted to the IDF on a number of occasions by the UNIFIL liaison officer. The morning of the July 25 started like preceding days, with aerial bombs and artillery raining down on Lebanon. During the day the village of Khiam was hit by 95 artillery strikes and 91 aerial bombs. In addition to many firings close from aerial bombs, the base was hit on numerous occasions by artillery. Throughout the day complaints were made by UNTSO, UNIFIL and the highest levels of UNHQ New York to the IDF and Israeli authorities concerning the level of strikes in and around the PB. Despite assurances from the IDF, the intensity didn't decrease. The vicinity of the PB experienced three waves of bombardment during the day. In the third wave Indbatt positions recorded 15 tank rounds fired to 100m east of the PB at 1830hrs, followed by five aerial bombs landing in or near the PB between 1915hrs and 2000hrs. A total of 26 artillery rounds were also recorded between 1950hrs and 2005hrs. UNTSO HQ in Jerusalem was informed by OGL that PB Khiam had received two firings close, comprising four artillery shells into the PB and an aerial bomb very close. The report stated that the gym and garage were demolished, the shelter door damaged, and that the PB was no longer operational. At 1925hrs UNIFIL notified the UNMOs in PB Khiam that they would evacuate the post the following morning. Five minutes later, at 1930hrs, PB Khiam failed to answer the scheduled radio check. In PB Mar we tried to establish contact using HF, VHF, sat phone, and individual cell phones, but there was no response. A recovery team from the nearby Indian battalion was dis- patched at 2010hrs but due to shelling and damaged roads it didn't arrive until 2155hrs. We had switched our radio to the Indbatt net to monitor their progress and with increasing concern we listened as they broke through the locked gate of the PB with an armoured car. Shortly afterwards we heard them report the near total destruc- tion of the base. Around 0155hrs we heard the rescue team transmit that they had found the body of a Chinese officer, followed shortly by a report that two additional bodies had been recovered. Slowly, and in a state of complete shock we came to realise that our four colleagues in the base had perished. The rescue team were only able to recover three bodies that night, and early the next morning a Ghanian convoy with three OGL UNMOs collected me at PB MAR and brought us to the mortu- ary in Marjayoun Hospital to commence the identification process. (It would be many days later, during the ceasefire, that we would recover the remains of our fourth colleague.) There is no easy way to prepare for the task of identifying the remains of colleagues and friends and that morning in Marjayoun, amid the noise of jets, artillery and Katyushas, will remain etched in our memories for ever. We positively identified one colleague, were 95% sure on an- other, and were completely unable to identify the third. It was clear to us that they had been killed instantly. Israeli soldiers after crossing back into Israel from Lebanon 31 July 2006. Photo: David Guttenfelder / AP

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