An Cosantóir

An Cosantóir November 2019 www.dfmagazine.ie 30 | were giving spiritual comfort where appropriate, their services unfortunately all too frequently required. The men of the 1st Airborne Division were doing two things concurrently fighting and waiting. Fighting their German attackers and waiting for the arrival of XXX Corps. They were all too aware that their situation was not ideal, but they were optimistic about what they believed was the imminent arrival of XXX Corps to relieve them. They were deter- mined they were going to hold out until they did so. In the interim the continued non-arrival of the resupply drops was frustrating in the extreme. It was not the fault of the RAF, indeed their courage and sacrifices were admirable; it was that the supplies were falling in the wrong places. Correctly speaking they were landing in the 'right' locations, but the British on the ground did not hold them anymore and communicating this fact had not been a success, so the valiant efforts of the RAF were largely in vain. To continue to fight, they urgently needed ammunition. They also desperately re- quired food, water and rest. Of course, they also had to avoid being killed and the German snipers and mortars were constantly doing to their utmost to achieve that! Mortar fire is deadly, its lethality derived not so much from the explosive effect, unless it was an unlikely but possible direct hit, rather from the slivers of fragmenting shrapnel subsequent to the shredding of its outer metallic case on impact; a killing radius of 25-50 metres. The larger the calibre the greater the killing area. Mortar duels developed between both sides. These duels however, frequently escalated in the numbers of mortars employed and the addition of artillery, German 88s, Airborne howitzers (75mm). Because they are fired indirectly, concealed from each other's observers, a mortar fire controller (MFC) or 'spotter' (for the artil- lery it is a Forward Observation Officer – FOO) gives directions and adjustments of the fall of shot onto the target. For him (like Major Tony Blake) to do so, he had to have had direct line of sight onto the target, to see the round's impact, how near, far or wide, and communications with the mortar or artillery firing line to call in the adjustments. Discovering each other's spotters' likely position, 'spotting the spotter' and neutralising him is a way of disrupt- ing the process and this makes his job a hazardous one. Far more hazardous of course is to be under a mortar barrage, to be in the area where mortar fire is being directed onto. The best defence of course is to put distance between yourself and that area as quickly as possible using the best cover available. If you cannot remove yourself but are duty bound to remain where you are, then to make yourself safe you quite literally occupy the ground you must hold by digging into it. As the name implies, 'slit trenches' are dug, firing positions excavated from the earth, overhead protection built in, to retreat into to take cover from mortar and artillery barrages, all of which is camouflaged and strict occupation discipline imposed. Depth is added to the defensive position by the siting of trenches over distance rearwards to prevent against being easily overrun. Support weapon trenches sited tactically throughout, bearing in mind the nature of the terrain. Well dug in troops can be difficult to dislodge. Given that the perimeter consisted of a mixture of built up suburban, open ground and woodlands type terrain, there were prepared defences in variations of slit trenches in gardens, streets and residential houses and buildings fortified to different degrees. These combinations of 'protection from fire' positions were where what remained of the 1st Airborne Division and from where they would do their fighting and waiting. Post D-Day, with the collapse of German resistance in France and Belgium in late August 1944, the end of the war was within sight. Operation 'Market Garden' was designed to bring it within reach. The Operation 'Market Garden' Plan was imaginative, daring and simple. Nothing like it had ever been attempted before. It was the first tome airborne troops were to be used strategically by the Al- lies on such a scale. 35,000 of them were to be flown from England, a distance of 300 miles and dropped behind enemy lines to seize and hold a series of bridges in Holland to allow an Allied armoured column of Corps strength advance 64 miles into enemy territory in order to consolidate a bridgehead from which the Allies could further their offensive. The brainchild of Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, with deep family roots in Counties Donegal and Derry, it was an uncharacteristically imaginative, audacious, and ambitious plan, and may well have spectacularly secured a 'Start Line' for a 'backdoor' Allied advance into Germany's industrial Ruhr and so likely have ended the Second World War before Christmas 1944, and consequently saved thousands of lives. Surprise and speed were crucial to the success of Operation 'Market Garden'. It was opportune to try, the prize a secure start line to strike into Germany itself. About the Author: Lt Col Dan Harvey, now retired, served on operations at home and abroad for over 35-years. He is the author of A Bloody Week - The Irish at Arnhem (reviewed on P37); A Bloody Dawn: The Irish at D-Day (2019); Soldiering Against Subversion: The Irish Defence Forces and Internal Security During the Troubles, 1969-1998 (2018); Into Action: Irish Peacekeepers Under Fire, 1960-2014 (2017); A Bloody Day: The Irish at Waterloo and A Bloody Night: The Irish at Rorke's Drift (both reissued 2017); and Sol- diers of the Short Grass: A History of the Curragh Camp (2016). Irish Guards Group, Guards Armoured Division, Aalst, 18th September 1944. German Troops during the battle for Arnhem bridge in 1944.

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