An Cosantóir

An Cosantóir March 2020 www.dfmagazine.ie 16 | identify, capture and dispose of vessels and enabling assets used, or suspected of being used, by migrant smugglers or traffickers, to contribute to wider EU efforts to disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the southern Central Mediterranean and prevent the further loss of life at sea. At its height the mission FHQ was located at sea on an Italian aircraft carrier (ITS Cavour). Since its inception over 58 naval units have participated in Op Sophia, including three Irish ships, LÉ Niamh, LÉ Samuel Beckett and LÉ James Joyce. The Defence Forces commitment at that time also included a Lt Cdr and PO in the FHQ. In March 2019 a decision was taken to withdraw naval surface assets from Op Sophia, which meant that the mission was left with only its air assets. Several countries, including Ireland, with- drew from the FHQ on the basis that as the force had reduced the rationale for maintaining full staffing had also diminished. This is a state of affairs that has left the mission under pressure. The product of such headquarters, especially the volume of mili- tary staff work and the requirements to manage force protec- tion, security and logistics, means that the work of the HQ is not directly proportional to the number of assets deployed. Nevertheless, since that date Op Sophia has had an extremely hardworking fleet of maritime patrol aircraft, tactically con- trolled by the FHQ and given direction and guidance by the OHQ, which interfaces on their behalf with the EU Military Staff in Brussels and with the numerous other agencies and stakehold- ers involved in this Mediterranean drama. The JOC is a busy work station manned by a multinational staff 24-7-365. Information flows from the patrolling air assets through the FHQ to the JOC, where it is distributed throughout the OHQ to the functional section requiring it (for example to Intelligence, Logistics, Operations, Personnel). The OHQ contains special staff sections such as Political Advisor and Legal Advisor, all of which receive the information transmitted from the FHQ for analysis. The Battle Rhythm in the OHQ then draws the conclusions and observations of each of these sections into the production of orders to the FHQ (the DOWN- REP) and reports to the EUMS (the ASSESSREP), whichbriefs member states and ensures that the most recent, accu- rate information from the highly complex AO is available to the EU's Political and Se- curity Committee. The JOC compiles and transmits these reports, in addition to daily sitreps and updates from all sections. The JOC is also the interface with other organisations at the operational and strategic level. It is the point of intersection with Op Sophia for the Italian Navy, the Italian Coast Guard, NATO, Brussels, other EU missions, such as Op Atlanta and EUBAM, FRONTEX, the UN. Therefore, the JOC's mission within the OHQ may be defined as the management and distribution of all of the mission's information. The other major function of the JOC is to maintain the Rec- ognised Maritime Picture (RMP). In practice, this means that CJ3 and the JOC must ensure that the operation commander (Admi- ral Credendino) and his command group have an up-to-date, fil- tered, accurate real-time picture of all activity at sea and in the air in the Central Mediterranean, in order to support stra- tegic and operational decision making. To this end, the JOC staff is divided into two sec- tions: the 'front row' of real-time data managers, centred on the JOC watchkeeper (usually an OF3 from any of the three services), and a 'back row' of information managers, centred on the JOC Director (usually an OF4). There is much discussion about the nature of the EU response to the crisis in Libya and, in particular, the nature of the interac- tion between the military mission and the numerous NGOs in- volved in migrant rescue operations, but an article of this nature cannot address the full spectrum of arguments. It is not a typical naval mission; the AO is packed with national, international and non-state actors, and there are layers and layers of agendas. The military task is delicately balanced. By its nature, a military mission must be tightly controlled, responsive to civilian authority, and observant of the law. It must also be robust, with the ability to defend itself and those it is charged to protect. It must also be capable of deterring certain types of behaviour. The maintenance of these capabilities, the neces- sary potential for the use of force, and the restrictions on communication and public relations necessitated by subordina- tion to the political, will mean Op Sophia, like many missions, can be portrayed at times as unsympathetic or ineffective by other actors who have more freedom but perhaps less overall responsibility in the same theatre. I am proud of Operation Sophia, of the medal I earned for my service there and of the performance there of my Defence Forces colleagues, and I hope the mission receives the neces- sary attention and resources it requires into the future.

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