An Cosantóir

An Cosantóir May 2020 www.dfmagazine.ie 22 | ing state capacity and addressing structural inequalities so as to empower the weak and bind the strong. Legitimisation of crisis management and other international security interven- tions would also be a central consideration. Were such an understanding of justice to apply to EU crisis management operations one might expect to see: Absolute precondition of UN or other multilateral authorisa- tion/legitimisation of crisis management operations. Operation with the full and active consent of all state parties. Dedication to the strengthening and security capacity build- ing of other state actors. Coordinated and cooperative engagement with other multi- lateral actors. Absence of normative assumptions/goals within operations (e.g. on gender, human rights, etc.). Absolute respect for local customs and values. This understanding of justice creates a model of crisis management almost wholly centred on guaranteeing state security. Issues of justice at the sub-state level are left to the state to resolve at its discretion. Issues of trans-border justice, such as climate, migration and trade etc., are left as a func- tion of interstate bargaining among equal partners – without precondition or expectation of shared norms/values. Such a vision of justice is also remarkably static in temporal terms, leaving little or no space to address historic injustices – the goal of which would be to ameliorate the effects of such historical injustices in terms of power asymmetries, rather than an effort to 'right' historical 'wrongs'. These lacunae are addressed in part by a second understanding of global justice. JUSTICE AS IMPARTIALITY Transitioning from a state-centric view of justice as non- domination to a view of justice grounded in shared and transcendent values entails a change of logic. While non-dom- ination presupposes the sovereign equality of states, justice as impartiality entails an equality in rights and freedoms – which runs across and through state borders. Dominance remains the injustice to be addressed, but in terms of justice as impartiality, its resolution rests in the 'need for a law-based order beyond the state' where 'justice should be the content of an agreement that would be reached by rational people under conditions that do not allow for bargaining power to be translated into advantage' (Barry 1989: 7, cited in Eriksen 2016: 13). In sum, the sovereign equality of states cannot, in and of itself, deliver justice. States must themselves – equally and fairly – be held to the requirement to deliver freedom to all. This serves to 'trump not merely collective goals but also national sovereignty understood in particular way' (Dworkin, 2011: 333, cited in Eriksen 2016: 14). This is achieved through [...] 'authoritative institutions that interpret and enforce valid norms' (Eriksen 2016: 15). Such institutions also construct a corpus of norms and expectations of state behaviour grounded in the key value of freedom. Justice as impartiality sees obstacles to freedom as problematic infringements of individual autonomy and therefore countenances intervention (which is itself of course a form of dominance) to vindicate that right to freedom for all people. As Eriksen (2016: 14) puts it, 'Freedom can only be re- stricted for the sake of freedom itself'. These are the grounds from which humanitarian intervention and the doctrine of responsibility to protect have evolved with 'justice' presented as a 'context-transcending principle' that can over-ride state sovereignty (Eriksen 2016: 14). In terms of security and crisis management this conception of justice has enormous and obvious implications. States are now not only responsible for the stability of the international system of sovereign states, but have obligations to defend freedom throughout – even at the expense of individual state sovereignty where deemed necessary. Critically, of course, such judgements as to what constitutes an obstacle to free- dom are not left to the judgement of any individual state or group of states, but must be determined by impartial global institutions. Even so, it presupposes universal agreement on the meaning and implications of 'freedom' as an over-riding value – which we know to be contested. For an actor such as the EU, this approach would have profound implications for the shape of crisis management: Emphasises the role of international institutions and multi-

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