An Cosantóir

An Cosantóir June 2020 www.dfmagazine.ie 22 | The Joint Action's common costs – born by the EU – were initially estimated at 99 million, rising eventually to 140 million. The balance of the total one billion euro budget was to be carried by contributing states. French costs included millions in support of the participation of Polish, Albanian, Russian and Ukrainian forces for equipment, ac- commodation, logistical support etc. (Giscard d'Estaing and Olivier- Coupeau, 2009). The initial set up of the operation was marked by the reluctant engagement of many EU partners. The Operational Command was ultimately assigned to an Irish Lieutenant General, Pat Nash at an informal defence ministers' meeting 28-29 September. President Sarkozy had personally to intervene with other heads of state and government to secure contributions of troops, equipment and spe- cialised units. An unprecedented five force generation conferences had to be held to address major gaps in enabling forces in tactical air transport, medical facilities and logistics, before General Nash was in a position to propose to the EU Political and Security Committee to launch the operation 'at the edge of acceptable capacity' in late January 2008. Even so, the force had no strategic reserve, having to rely instead on 'a nod and a wink' from several member states that in extremis they would assist (author's interview, 2017). Of the 26 con- tributing countries (included three non-EU states), France provided more than half of the 3,700 troops with 13 countries offering fewer than ten individuals each. From the outset, the EU mission struggled against perceptions that it was an essentially a French effort designed to buttress the Déby government (Tull 2008; Marchal 2009). Certainly, the operation served to stabilise the region and thereby the Chadian state. Indeed the French force commander, Jean-Philippe Ganascia, was subject to domestic French criticism that the operation did not dovetail more effectively with the parallel French military establishment of nearly 1,200 troops already operating in Chad from 1986 as Opération Éper- vier. Ganascia and Nash insisted upon a strict distinction between French forces and EU forces with Ganascia declaring that EU forces would maintain a distance from the French military stationed as part of the bilateral Franco-Chadian defence accord. He insisted that, 'There is not a single common point between [the French troops] mis- sion and ours' (The Irish Times, 11 February 2008). At the same time, those lines had to be underscored on occasion. Both the deputy force commander, Irish Colonel Derry Fitzgerald and the Operation Commander, Pat Nash, had to underline the neutral- ity of the EU operation in the face of repeated attempts to draw EU forces alongside their Chadian counterparts. President Déby went so far as to insist that he review the draft final concept of operations (CONOPs), that he would assign – by prior agreement with France – up to 1,000 Chadian troops to the EU force and that he would deter- mine the location of the command headquarters. Similarly, General Nash twice countermanded orders that EU forces would jointly patrol with Chadian military and police units. He also insisted on multiple redrafts of the EU force's initial CONOPS – having been presented with a French-language draft as a fait accompli even before taking up operational command at the French military headquarters at Mont Valérien, Paris (OHQ) in October 2007. A critical issue here was the repeated French insistence on the creation of a 'Land Forces Com- mand' as part of the mission. This would have served to insert the French General – originally a nominee as Operations Commander – as number two in the command structure thus 'relieving' the Irish Op- erations Commander of significant responsibility. At Irish insistence, this structure did not emerge. The initial deployment of EUFOR Special Forces to Chad was further delayed by several weeks as nearly 4,000 rebels launched an attack on the Chadian capital in late January 2008 following a 1,000 km dash from eastern Chad to N'Djamena. Their advance was swift, and within days they were besieging the presidential palace. The attack was only barely repulsed with the support of French national forces stationed in Chad and the arrival of additional armour and weapons airlifted by France from Libya. Advance EU Special Forces (French and Austrian) were already on the ground to provide protection for incoming EUFOR forces. Strictly speaking, such forces were unau- thorised but were a necessary precondition for effective deployment. With the rebel attack, these forces were suddenly very vulnerable and while the Austrian forces kept their heads down, the French Spe- cial Forces engaged alongside their national compatriots to defend the airport from rebel control. OPERATION AND IMPACT Initial Operational Capacity was declared on 15 March 2008. This was preceded and followed by a herculean logistical effort to provide for over 3,500 troops across a 350,000 km2 theatre of operations without a single kilometre of paved road. This entailed moving thousands of tonnes of equipment and material from the Cameroon coast at Douala, across thousands of miles of desert via 21 rail and 140 road convoys and over 500 strategic airlifts to airfields and unpaved airstrips newly built/reconstructed for the purpose (Harvey 2015). In terms of resupplies – which included bottled water airlifted from the Chadian capital – each container took two weeks to travel from Europe to Cameroon, two weeks to reach N'Djamena and a further week to get to the forward command headquarters at Abéché. Full operating capacity was reached on 18 September 2008. The deploy- ment included a rear Force Headquarters (FHQ) at N'Djamena, the main FHQ at Abeche and three batallions stationed in the eastern Chad areas of Iriba (North), Forchana (Centre) and Goz Beida (South), as well as a detachment in Birao (Central African Republic). The mission lacked sufficient tactical airlift and there were ongoing limitations with medevac support which for some time restricted the extent and range of the patrols used to give effect to mission goals. Over the course of the 12 month operation, EUFOR's focus was in providing wide area security. This was pursued on the ground through extensive local intelligence gathering, consultations with

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