An Cosantóir

An Cosantóir September / October 2023 www.military.ie/magazine OPTIMISING CAVALRY TACTICS THROUGH INTUITIVE DECISION MAKING BY LT STEPHEN M. DOYLE, CAVALRY SCHOOL MA STUDENT AT UCC SCHOOL OF HISTORY T hroughout the history of Warfare, few combat units have carried the aura and majesty of the Cavalry. From the iconic image of Napoleonic Hussars thundering across the battlefields of Europe to the light dragoons who spurred their way into history during the American War of Independence, cavalry forces have traditionally embodied a unique blend of mobility, shock action, and flexibility on the battlefield. As warfare evolved, so did these equestrian soldiers, transitioning from horse-mounted combatants to mechanised units in modern armies. Today, the role of cavalry, while different from its historical origins, retains the essence of adaptability and mobility. This article examines how to best prepare cavalry forces, taking lessons from history while meeting the challenges of 21st-century warfare. Historically, both hussars and dragoons played pivotal roles in warfare due to their versatility and mobility on the battlefield. Hussars, originally from Hungary in the late 14th 1 century, were renowned for their light cavalry roles, especially in reconnaissance and irregular warfare. With their exceptional horsemanship and high mobility, hussars were often deployed for swift hit-and- run attacks, harassment of enemy lines, disrupting supply routes, and sowing confusion and disorder in enemy ranks. On the other hand, dragoons, a term originating from the 16th century French Army 2 , were unique as they were trained for both mounted and dismounted combat roles. They could ride into battle swiftly but dismount and fight as infantry, combining the advantages of mobility and tactical versatility. Dragoons were often used for scouting, patrolling, and providing flexible and quick responses to changing battlefield conditions .3 Relating these historical roles to contemporary conflicts, we can draw parallels with modern light and mechanised units. Light cavalry forces akin to the hussars would excel at reconnaissance, scouting and surveillance. They offer the superior command the ability to rapidly deploy forces, disrupt enemy plans, and gather intelligence, similar to their historical counterparts. The dragoons' concept is embodied in modern-day mechanised units that can move quickly across the battlefield in armoured vehicles but can also dismount to engage in infantry warfare. These units are essential for flexible responses in unpredictable modern combat scenarios, particularly in urban environments. They offer a balance of speed, protection, and firepower, making them invaluable assets in contemporary conflict. Integral to this brand of the manoeuverist approach to warfare is a Mission command philosophy. Description automatically generated Centred on a decentralising decision-making authority to empower subordinate commanders and has long served as a force multiplier on the battlefield. 4 Historical campaigns, from the lightning manoeuvres of Napoleon's Marshals 5 to the audacious operations of Rommel's Panzer divisions 6 , have demonstrated its effectiveness. It allowed these leaders to harness the ingenuity, initiative, and adaptability of their officers & NCOs, thereby adding depth, speed, and responsiveness to their operations. In today's era of high-tempo and often asymmetric warfare, the need for such an approach is even more significant. By enhancing the intuitive decision-making capabilities of subordinate commanders, we can foster a more agile and responsive military structure. Understanding the commander's intent becomes paramount, not as a script to be rigidly followed, but as a strategic framework that provides the 'Left & Right of Arc' within which they can improvise and adapt. This approach doesn't only reduce planning time but also enables the early deployment of cavalry forces, thereby enhancing the superior commander's course of action (COA) development. The prowess of our cavalry forces, combining mobility and firepower, can be best exploited when led by commanders empowered by mission command philosophy. While modern communication systems have undoubtedly enhanced operational capabilities, an overreliance on them can potentially undermine the essence of the mission command philosophy. This philosophy requires fostering a culture of trust and mutual understanding between superior commanders and their subordinates, something that cannot be achieved through technology alone. The operation that led to the demise of Osama bin Laden is often lauded as a model of military precision and coordination. However, the image of President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and their top military advisers, intently watching the operation unfold in real time from the White House Situation Room 7 , opens a discourse on the risks of over-involvement by higher command in tactical operations. This level of engagement, made possible by advances in communication and surveillance technologies, can unintentionally lead to a style of micromanagement that runs counter to the principles of mission command. While it can be tempting for superior commanders to exploit these technologies to exercise control over every aspect of an operation, it can restrict the freedom of action needed by subordinates on the ground; this can stifle their initiative, agility, and responsiveness - key elements for success in complex and rapidly evolving situations. Higher echelon commanders must resist the allure of delving too deeply into the tactical sphere, instead focusing on their own institutional levels of war. Modern communication and surveillance capabilities should be used as tools for enhancing situational Le Trophee 1806 4th Dragoon Regiment A diagram of a successful mission command 40mm Grenade Machine Gun being loaded on the LTAV

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