An Cosantóir

An Cosantóir January / February 2024 www.military.ie/magazine 24 | THE IRISH VOLUNTEERS AT WAR, 1916 – 1923 BY TOM O'NEILL, COMDT RDF (RETD) PHOTOS PROVIDED BY TOM O'NEILL, COMDT RDF (RETD) PART 1: THE 1916 RISING This is the first of three articles covering the changing methodology of war fighting used by the Irish forces from 1916 to 1923. The second article will cover the War of Independence and part three, the Civil War. This article is an ideal opportunity to look at the changing strategy of the armed elements of the Irish Citizen Army, the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Republican Army, during the 1916 Rising, the War of Independence and the Civil War, now that we have reached the end of our centenary commemorations for the decade of revolution, 1913 – 1923. It is important to bear in mind that the officers and members of the Irish Citizen Army, the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Republican Army, were civilians. The vast majority of the members were almost entirely lacking any formal military training. It is ironic that the majority of the members of these three groups that had received military training and experience did so while serving with the British Armed Forces during World War One. The 1916 Rising The planning for the 1916 Rising was a natural progression for the Irish Volunteers, considering the tradition for armed rebellions that existed within Irish revolutionary and independence organisations during the previous two centuries. These included the rebellion by the United Irishmen in 1798, Robert Emmet's rising in 1803, the Young Irelanders in 1848 and the Fenians in 1867. A common theme during these attempts at gaining independence was their use of conventional warfare. This was never going to succeed considering the massive numerical superiority of troops and the abundance of arms and equipment available to the British Forces. The British also had total superiority over the Irish revolutionary organisations in their use of military intelligence. The Irish revolutionary organisations were successfully infiltrated by British spies and informers, resulting in the British authorities acquiring the plans of the intended rebellions and the identities of the leaders. These infiltrations by British agents and informers happened on so many occasions prior to the 1916 Rising, that this led to a paranoia within the Volunteer Executive about the possible infiltration by British agents in the lead up to it. This greatly contributed to the failure of the Rising because the plans (for the rising) were kept so secret, that even those senior Irish Volunteer officers that needed to know the plans in advance, were kept in the dark until it was too late. When studying the lead up to the 1916 Rising, the lack of command experience within the leaders becomes evident. There was a lack of communications, as well as a lack of clear and decisive orders from the leaders in Dublin, to their colleagues in the provinces. This resulted in orders, countermanding orders and utter confusion within the Irish Volunteers across the country, which prevented a general uprising. Outside Dublin, many of the Volunteers did not learn that the Rising had started until they read it subsequently in the newspapers. The very limited logistics that were in place for the 1916 Rising also illustrates the lack of military experience within the leadership of the Irish Volunteers and Irish Citizen Army. The success or failure of the Rising largely depended on the availability of weapons, such as rifles, revolvers, light machine-guns and adequate ammunition. These were the basic requirements for the Volunteers, to enable them to fight against the well-armed British Forces. One of the problems that the Volunteers and later the IRA faced throughout the years of revolution, was the difficulty of maintaining an adequate supply of small arms and ammunition. This difficulty was compounded by the diverse range of weapons used by the Volunteers, which resulted in the requirement for different types of ammunition. In comparison the British Army and RIC, used one calibre of rifle ammunition, the ".303". The rifles, revolvers and ammunition smuggled into Ireland before the rising were totally inadequate. What was considered the vital delivery was the weapons, ammunition and explosives on the 'Aud'. The 'Aud' was the cargo ship sent from Germany, to arm and equip the volunteers that intended participating in the Rising. The ship was carrying 20,000 Russian Mosin-Nagant 7.62mm rifles, ten Maxim machine-guns, one million rounds of assorted ammunition and explosives. At first glance, these numbers appear to suggest that there were sufficient weapons and ammunition on the 'Aud' to start a small war, until we look at the figures in more detail. It is important to bear in mind, that at that time, a trained soldier could fire ten aimed rounds rapid fire, in thirty seconds, with a bolt action rifle. When the Ulster Volunteers successfully smuggled in weapons, they decided on fewer rifles and more ammunition. From my experience with the Russian Mosin- Nagant rifles, these rifles were perfect for the Irish Volunteers. Simple to operate and maintain, accurate, a devastating round and on par with Mrs Erskine Childers and Ms Mary Spring-Rice examine rifles and cases of ammunition on board Erskine Childers' yacht 'Asgard', on their way to Howth, Co. Dublin, 1914. (Photo from 'Dublin 1916') The General Post Office, Dublin, before the 1916 Rising. (Photo from 'Dublin 1916') A depiction of inside the General Post Office during the Rising including P H Pearse, Tom Clarke and James Connolly on the stretcher. (Photo from 'The Revolutionary Years')

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