An Cosantóir

| 23 www.military.ie THE DEFENCE FORCES MAGAZINE sentries were posted and forgotten. Their most costly failure for the IRA, for not following the basic rules of warfare, was at Clonmult, east Cork, on Sunday, 20th February 1921. The east Cork flying column remained in a disused farmhouse for six weeks. The building had only one door and nothing was done about it. Just hours before the battle, the column commander went on reconnaissance and took his second-in-command and third-in-command with him. This weakened the command structure of the column. The two sentries that were detailed, abandoned their posts shortly before the British Army arrived and the acting column commander ignored them. In the ensuing battle, the column was wiped out and only the acting column commander escaped. The logistics of supplying weapons and ammunition was a major difficulty for the IRA throughout the War of Independence. Some weapons and ammunition were smuggled into the country. However, the bulk of their weapons and ammunition was captured during successful actions against the Crown Forces, particularly during 1920. Another important new development for the IRA officers after the 1916 Rising, was that they finally realised the importance of including an intelligence branch within their organisation and recognising the importance of winning the intelligence war. The IRA recognised the importance of having their own spies, touts and informers. The IRA created a directorate of intelligence and Michael Collins was a most successful Director of Intelligence. This was a major new development for the Irish Volunteers/IRA. Michael Collins and his intelligence staff set up a national intelligence network to co-ordinate the IRA's intelligence and counterintelligence war. Intelligence officers were appointed at IRA Brigade headquarters and locally at Battalion headquarters. Individual officers and Volunteers were made aware of the vital importance of collecting information on the Crown Forces. The local officers and members of the Irish Volunteers/IRA were also made aware of the requirement for security of their own information and the need for vigilance at all levels against British spies and informers, which is counterintelligence. The IRA had a single head, or director of intelligence. This enabled all intelligence to be collected, analysed and passed on quickly, so that actions could be taken. Fortunately for the IRA, the Crown Forces had a head of Military Intelligence and also a head of police intelligence and neither side trusted the other. As a result, for most of the War of Independence, there was only the minimum of intelligence shared between the RIC and the British Army. The IRA recruited their own spies, informers and in Dublin, the famous 'Squad.' These were successfully incorporated into the IRA's war fighting machine and they became the main operatives in the IRA's intelligence and counterintelligence war against the Crown Forces. These IRA spies, informers and the 'Squad' became extremely successful and their work weakened the Crown Forces fighting and intelligence gathering capability. The widespread support of the population was vital for the success of the IRA. A guerrilla army could never survive in the field without this support. The proof of this widespread support can be seen in the diverse occupations and professions of the imprisoned republicans. Every male occupation in Ireland was represented among the almost four thousand IRA men held as prisoners and internees. The active involvement of the women of Ireland was another major asset for the IRA. Not only from the members of Cumann na mBan, but also the women and girls in the communities across the country. Their involvement in gathering intelligence, carrying messages, nursing wounded Volunteers, carrying dispatches, hiding weapons, and many other vital activities, were essential. By the time of the Truce on 11 July 1921, the outcome of the military war between the IRA and the Crown Forces was indecisive, where neither side could declare a victory. The Sinn Féin / IRA combination undoubtedly did win the intelligence and propaganda war. The outrages perpetrated by the Crown Forces, particularly by the RIC Auxiliary Police, the executions of IRA prisoners, the hunger strikes, the official and unofficial burning of property, turned public opinion against the continued occupation of Ireland. This in turn put international pressure on the British government to seek a political resolution to what they referred to as 'The Irish Question.' While the British Army in Ireland still believed that they could defeat the IRA, it was their political masters that capitulated. The British politicians were primarily concerned with their own and their political parties' reputations. This as well as international pressure led to the Truce and to the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 6th December 1921. The War officially ended one month later after the Treaty was ratified by the three governments in Westminster, Belfast and Dublin. The Treaty was narrowly ratified by Dáil Eireann, by just sixty-four votes to fifty-seven. Unfortunately, the terms of the Treaty, in particular the failure to achieve a republic, led to a split in the IRA. There was much more Irish blood to be spilt. Author: Tom O'Neill from Midleton, Co. Cork is an assistant manager on Spike Island. He served in An FCA and the RDF and retired as a Commandant. He regularly has articles on Irish military history published in Ireland's Own. His books include 'The Battle of Clonmult' and 'Spike Island's Republican Prisoners 1921'. He co-wrote 'The History of the 23 Infantry Battalion FCA'. This is the second of three articles on this topic published in An Cosantóir. Collins Hit Team Members of the West Mayo Fklying Column during the Anglo-Irish War L-R Seamus Robinson, Sean Treacy, Dan Breen & Sean Hogan. Treacy was killed in Dublin on Oct 14 1920 & Breen & Robinson went on to become senior anti-Treaty IRA leaders during the Civil War.

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