An Cosantóir

| 5 www.military.ie THE DEFENCE FORCES MAGAZINE Zaluzhnyi Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2009, the Russian military established a separate branch of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the electronic warfare (EW) troop. In addition, a powerful air component of electronic warfare was stood up which ensures the effective employment of forces and precision weapons. They increased the production of so-called "trench electronic warfare" ("Silok","Piton", "Harpoon", "Piroed", "Strizh", "Lisochok "), which evolved at the tactical level. As for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, by 2022, they developed modern electronic warfare assets such as UAVs "Bukovel-AD", "Enclave", "Khmara", and "Nota". UAVs are being increased by deploying the "Pokrova" nationwide EW system with the intent of replacing the satellite radio navigation field to prevent spoofing, suppressing the satellite radio navigation. In 2024, the Russian army further evolved its method of attack by adopting small assault group tactics with commanders monitoring troop movement through live footage and directing troops by radio. The dispersal of Artillery (by guns), firing from the maximum range and the use of new electronic warfare assets such as the "Pole 21" an electronic countermeasure system in order to protect their artillery. In addition, the Russians quite widely and effectively began to use the Lancet loitering munition with target "illumination", the Orlan, Zala UAVs and others for counter-battery. The Ukraine Military utilisation of the Excalibur 55 mm shell initially proved quite effective in the fight against self-propelled artillery and counter- battery radars. However, over time, their capabilities have significantly decreased, since the targeting system uses GPS and is very sensitive to the influence of electronic warfare, which leads to a loss of precision. Russian cyber-attacks failed due to preparations by the Ukrainians with the assistance from Western civilian companies and governments to create effective cyber protection, redundancy and non-computerised alternatives to systems that depend on computers. An interesting study of the war in Ukraine identifies the most important effort in cyber is the defence of critical infrastructure. Unlike during routine security operations and the campaign between wars or special operations, cyber-attacks and influence operations are not the main effort. The main efforts are the large-scale regular military operations and they serve almost only to support them or enhance them. In conclusion, we must prepare our forces to operate in a technology- contested space, where we may need to remove or limit our electromagnetic spectrum signature. A recurring theme of dispersal comes to mind the old adage of spread out and do not bunch up. We must examine our electromagnetic spectrum signature in a dispersed manner. We must develop hybrid tactics techniques and procedures for ourselves. To do this we need to revisit our fieldcraft manuals and operating procedures. Just as glass and the telescope became a reconnaissance tool of the past, now small cheap disposal UAVs not alone reconnoitre an area but can map precisely, identify targets and adjust fire on to a target. Instead of falling into old habits and routines, we must ask ourselves, why do we do this and can we do it better? To be detected now in the current targeting cycle is to be engaged, the hardening of our defences may not be the best solution but manoeuvre, masking, and deception may provide as much protection as hardened defences. Our increase demand for data may also make us more vulnerable and less survivable. There is a requirement for the Army to adapt a 'Janus Face' one side looking back to reconnect with warfighting fundamentals which have been reaffirmed as crucial to compete in the contemporary operating environment; while the other looks forward and determines how emerging technology can be integrated into tactical operations. Tactics are a science, but applying tactics in combat is an art. A military force wins by seeing how general principles apply to a specific situation and by being creative with combat solutions. In the coming months and years, in order to build a robust and sustainable Defence Force ecosystem throughout the transformation process, many parts must remain in synergy while being maintained and advance continuously. A paradox is setting up for future operations by training in the past, we need to close the gap between what is thought and taught in our schools. Perhaps it is now timely to update TM200 accordingly. Credit for captioned images - Ares & Athena publication issue 25 "Human Fundamentals of organisational design". CHACR published on the 15 July 2024 References and original sources were provided by the author to the editor and can be obtained by contacting the editor Drones are becoming increasingly small and harder to detect Militaries are using UAVs in swarms to overwhelm the enemy Members of the Artillery Corps operating a UAV in DFTC

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