An Cosantóir

An Cosantóir July/August 2015 www.dfmagazine.ie 16 | by CAPT PHELIM GIBBONS, INSTR, ORD SCH, DFTC G iven the continuing character of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) problem, vigilant reflection is required to ensure that the necessary counter-IED capability and capacity exist to meet future threats across the spectra of military operations. The US Department of Defense's JIEDDO (Joint IED Defeat Organisation) estimates that in the past year there have been over 20,000 IED events worldwide that caused 50,000 casualties and that this prob- lem is iterating, adapting and changing over time as physical and operative force-protection measures improve. Since 2007 the Ordnance Corps has been to the forefront of developing a C-IED culture, nationally and internationally, exempli- fied by the training of up to 200 C-IED and weapons intelligence instructors, C-IED ISAF staff appointments, the fielding of new capabilities and involvement in the genesis, evolution, specifica- tion and staffing of the Theatre Exploitation Laboratory Demon- strator (TELD) (18 month concept to "market"), the Multi National Theatre Exploitation Laboratory (MNTEL) and the Joint Deployable Exploitation Analysis Laboratory (JDEAL) under the aegis of the European Defence Agency. The development of a national C-IED doctrine is also underway. The recently concluded Home Made Explosives (HME) and Weapons Intelligence Team (WIT) courses and the upcoming C-IED Instructors course are proof of an adaptable approach to the concept of 'lessons learnt' and an ongoing commitment to the 'comprehensive approach' across agencies and services. WIT training has emerged from the need for improved plan- ning and interagency co-operation in C-IED operations, and this 'need' needs to be constantly addressed. In February the Ordnance School conducted its second WIT course, qualifying 12 personnel as weapons intelligence investigators, and bringing the number of Defence Forces WIT investigators to over 50 since the first courses were conducted in 2011. The course brought together EOD, military police and C-IED instructors over a three-week period and was divided into two phases. Phase one was of one week's duration in which data and analysis of IEDs, weapons, explosives, electronics, photography and forensics was delivered, along with explana- tions of the concepts and thinking underlying the necessity for weapons technical intelligence and the need for WIT in current operations. Phase two assessed the students practically as WIT members and investigators and assessed the assimila- tion of knowledge and fo- rensic exploitation tech- niques to Level 1 standard, culminating in an exercise that focused on post-blast analysis and the delivery of Level 1 reports However, from a WIT per- spective there remains work to be done to harmonise relations among organiza- tions, and the examination of forensic and technical exploitation capability with multi- service/inter-corps concepts of operation is at a nascent stage here. Fruitful discussion and co-operation with the military police exists with regard to forensic exploitation but the utility of weapons technical intelligence and its associated teams needs further communication and acceptance at both the tactical and operational level. It was very clear from our student feedback that Level 1 WIT qualifications would enhance the technical expertise of any soldier and provide obvious benefits in terms of intelligence gathering and force protection, but also that a WIT team can become a primary educative and informative pillar in a unit's development of a threat assessment. Successful technical and forensic exploitation, which is the role of a WIT, has been proven to provide an alleviation of the costs of technological surprise in terms of personnel, money and equipment by delivering better intelligence to command- ers when planning and prioritising their operations. WIT is also a direct contributor to the doctrinal C-IED lines of operation: attack the network, defeat the device and prepare the force. The military decision-making processes must consider the myriad technical provisions that emerge from the delibera- tions of WIT investigations. Some of our students for ex- ample, were veterans of recent tours of duty in the Middle East and expressed, from a purely tactical standpoint, the value potential of a WIT in terms of the exploitation of an IED incident with the consequent data yield on incident geom- etry assisting friendly forces to recognise where an IED is emplaced or initiated. Physical evidence cannot be wrong, it cannot perjure itself, it cannot be wholly absent. Only human failure to find it, study it, and understand it, can diminish its value. Paul l kirk 1953. crime Investigation, ny

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