An Cosantóir

www.military.ie the defence forces magazine | 29 peace- keepers, they lacked the re- sources to sup- ply and equip them without exten- sive West- ern aid, which was not forth- coming. Meanwhile, the RPF had resumed its military campaign and their 20,000 troops went on the offensive. Disciplined and well trained, they made striking progress under Kagame's impressive leadership against the undisciplined Rwandan military. Faced with the Rwandan government's collapse, the French intervened. The Rwandan government was Francophone and Paris had long supported the regime with investment and military aid. As such, they were reluctant to see Rwanda fall to the Anglophone RPF. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter the Security Council au- thorised a French military operation, Operation Turquoise, to set up a safe zone in Rwanda's south west. (The rapid deployment of French soldiers showed how quickly a professional military could have mobilized against the genocide.) Meanwhile, by 18th July 1994 the RPF decisively defeated the Rwandan military and swore in the Hutu, Pasteur Bizimungu, as president. This caused an exodus of tens of thousands of Rwandan government soldiers and officials to the French safe zone and on to refugee camps in Zaire. French soldiers did not disarm the fleeing genocidaires and they swiftly took control of the refugee camps and led guerrilla raids into Rwanda, leading to the current war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Although Operation Turquoise saved thousands of civilians, it allowed the mass escape of Hutu extremists and soldiers to Zaire where they could regroup. Maj Gen Dallaire argued that instead of creating a new Chapter VII mission, French forces could have bolstered UNAMIR, which simply lacked the mandate and strength to be effective amidst the genocide. Maj Gen Dallaire spent 70% of his time battling UN logistics and his superiors prevented him from taking a proactive ap- proach. Even with the troops at his disposal, UNAMIR had the potential to save even more civilians from the undisciplined and poorly armed genocidaires if it had the authority to do so: General Ndindiliyimana of the Rwandan Gendarmerie advised Maj Gen Dallaire that the genocidaires would "melt away" from an assertive UNAMIR. Despite the worsening situation, UNAMIR's mandate remained the same, preventing it from effectively deterring violence and protecting civilians. Had UNAMIR the military capabilities to operate, even in Kigali, it is difficult to imagine that the geno- cide would have been so successful. Nonetheless, UNAMIR had notable successes. Maj Gen Dallaire cited the effectiveness of peacekeepers from Ghana and Tunisia. Many peacekeepers scoured Rwanda for survivors, with Senegalese Captain Diagne Mbaye having a particular gift for delivering civilians to safety until he was killed by a mortar round. Overall, UNAMIR personnel protected over 30,000 Rwan- dans, as the genocidaires were unwilling to commit atrocities if foreigners were present. This allowed ten peacekeepers and four military observers to save hundreds of Rwandans at the Hotel Des Mille Collines. The issue of intervention shows the importance of UN mission mandates. UNAMIR's mandate ignored the high risk of violence and deployed a peacekeeping force that was shackled when genocide broke out. Although numerous states condemned the decision to withdraw UNAMIR's troops, none were prepared to mount an intervention and the Rwandan genocide highlights that even when the Security Council is willing to allow interven- tion, states will often balk at deploying troops, even if many lives could be saved for very little risk. Cian Moran is a PhD candidate and Hardiman Fellow at NUI Gal- way where he is researching military intervention under interna- tional law. He is also a serving member of the RDF. AFP graphic Rwandan children are escorted by government militiamen in Kigali. Photo by: © Abdelhak Senna/AFP/Getty Images Rwandan government soldiers fire heavy artillery at rebel positions. Photo by: © Alexander Joe/AFP/Getty Images

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