An Cosantóir

www.military.ie the defence forces magazine | 27 that effort is worth remembering though; Casement's landing from a German submarine on Banna Strand; the Aud, with 20,000 rifles onboard, disguised as a Norwegian ship, signalling frantically; the acci- dental drowning of the Volunteers that were to meet her; her voyage, under detention, to Cork; and running up the German ensign before being scuttled by her captain –a symbolic scuppering of the chances of success for the rebellion. Through their gun running activities and their attempts to utilise German naval capability to achieve their ends, the rebels were aware of the problems posed by Ireland's island status. Erskine Childers showed in his pre-war writings, a clear understanding of Mahan's naval strategy. (The characters in his prescient novel The Riddle of the Sands even quote Mahan to each other.) The Rising's leadership was therefore, at some level, conscious of the dangers posed to their effort from the sea. This awareness, however, did not translate into practical counter- measures. Daire Brunicardi, in his book Haulbowline; The Naval Base and Ships of Cork Harbour (The History Press Ireland, 2012), states that it was intended to capture Carlisle Pier in Kingstown (Dun Laoghaire) to prevent troops landing there but that the lack of man- power [caused by contradictory mobilisation orders] required this objective to be abandoned. Brunicardi also notes that the seizure of the radio transmitters in Dublin by the rebels was probably the first such act –and since much copied– in revolutionary history but that the presence of Royal Navy ships meant communications with Britain were maintained. In fact, when the power to Kingstown Wireless Telegraphy station was cut, the only communication between Britain and her forces in Ireland was by HMS Adventure's radio in Kingstown. Conscious of this, Eamon de Valera considered sending an armed train down the line from his position at Boland's Mill but demurred, probably due to the remarkably swift landing of British troops there from Liverpool. Therefore, the rebels' plan to seize the communications infrastructure of Dublin and prevent early British reinforcement was undone by the simple presence of naval units. British naval activity was not limited to communications. Land- ings were conducted at Skerries and infantry was also moved by sea from Cork to Galway, where HMS Laburnum also shelled a Volunteer column. Famously, the Helga shelled Liberty Hall with her 12-pounder. Less well known is that she also shelled Boland's Mills and the Dublin Distillery building, and moved troops around Dublin Bay, across the Liffey, and between Dublin and Kingstown. Not only does such action demonstrate the reach and mobility of even modestly accoutred naval ships, it also demonstrates a signifi- cant military failing of the rebels. The Helga and the other naval units involved were able to move with impunity as the rebels lacked weap- ons of sufficient calibre and range to threaten them. (It is a common failing of land-centric forces that when confronted with the need to tackle naval ships they find that typical infantry and infantry support weapons lack the range and payload required.) This freedom of naval movement meant that Volunteer positions could never be sure of the axis of attack while having no meaningful riposte to hand. Britain was well practiced at navy/army co-ordination and was organised and swift in transporting troops and equipment from Liver- pool and Cork. The rebel leaders realised the importance of preventing reinforcements from Britain but were powerless to stop them. They had only managed a gallant but piecemeal importation of weapons and ammunition using leisure craft before losing the major shipment on the Aud and they were unable to interfere with maritime freedom of movement. They lacked the weapons and vessels to impede even the riverine and littoral movements of enemy ships and their effort to cut communications with Britain was undermined by the presence of the navy. In short, they had no maritime capability. Awareness that the sea would be central to the result was not allowed to develop into an actual maritime strategy for the Ris- ing. However, this was a wilful ignorance, not a lack of consider- ation. The leaders of the rebellion did understand the implica- tions of not controlling the sea supply lines; that it would be only a matter of time before they were defeated. However, they were not in a position to challenge Britain's sea power, nor could they have been. Sea power has always been highly technical and highly expensive. In the industrial age, it requires an indus- trial base. For an irregular, non-state organisation to establish seapower is highly unusual. For the rebels to have done so under the nose of the greatest naval power in the world was impos- sible, and their attempts to harness German naval power were thwarted. This, at some level, was surely what crystallised for Pearse and the others the strategic necessity of a sacrifice. The awareness of their lack of maritime power, and the consequent desperation of any military effort they might make, contributed to the inspirational, if somewhat romantic, approach taken by the leaders of the Poets' Rebellion. Lt Cdr Caoimhín Mac Unfraidh An example of a 12-pounder gun is preserved at the Naval Base, Haulbowline. The plaque shows date-of-manufacture as 1917, making it the same type of gun used by the HELGA to bombard Dublin during the Rising.

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