An Cosantóir

www.military.ie the defence forces magazine | 21 Israeli M-48 tanks moving east across the Suez Canal on the Israeli-constructed causeway. The last Israeli units to pull back into Sinai. 21st February 1974. Photo: UN Photo/Yutaka Nagata #129753 UNEF checkpoint at the entrance into the El Cap buffer zone on the road running alongside the Suez Canal. 1st December 1956. Photo: UN Photo #127894 Lt Eddie Casserly (retd) pictured (on the left) beside a USAF Lockheed C-130 Hercules when 32 Inf Bn landed in the Goma, Congo. Also pictured is the DCO Joe Adams. Photo: Military Archives (MA_129_006) Airman Archie Raeside, photographer with 32 Inf Bn, the first unit to deploy to the Congo in July 1960. His book 'The Congo 1960: The First Irish United Nations Peacekeepers' published in 2004 is compiled from his diary and includes his photographs and newspaper cuttings from the early days of ONUC. Photo: Military Archives (MA_129_007) To this writer, this reference meant that there was a plan – of sorts, at least – and this led to another question: What sort of a plan and why? As mentioned, no documents for the formation period of 32 Inf Bn were discovered in Mili- tary Archives, but the 'why' aspect remained. There had to be a reason for this 'study', if only prudent plan- ning by general staff. The 'why' led to the revelation of one of the more interesting, previ- ously undiscovered, facets of Defence Forces' history. This was that in August 1957 the Irish government – principally the departments of External Affairs and Defence – had care- fully considered an anticipated request for armed troops to join UNEF Suez, Egypt. This was formed as a buffer force following on the Anglo-French-Is- raeli assault on Suez in November 1956. In the event, no formal request for an Irish contingent was received. Documents supporting the government's considerations in 1957 – three years before the Congo mission began – were found in the files of the Dept of the Taoiseach in Irish National Archives during a comprehensive research review of files relating to UN matters. The overall tone of the observations from various govern- ment ministers and the views of department secretaries general strongly suggests that if a formal request had been made, Irish soldiers would have been dispatched to Suez in 1957. Comprehensive material from the Dept of Defence and DFHQ, outlined the results of their feasibility studies, and this writer is of the view that these formed the basis for, or were developed into, an action or contingency plan in the event of future UN requests for troops. This planning, therefore, was what General McKeown had referred to in 1996 and was the planning on which the forma- tion of 32 Inf Bn was effected. However, the most significant element of this research was the discovery of a planned, possible, Defence Forces contribution to a UN force three years before the historic mission to the Congo. In conclusion, it is apposite to remark upon concerns common to defence planners in both 1957 and in 1960: the strength of the Defence Forces. In 1957, the Dept of Defence assessment noted that 'our existing battalions are very much below strength at the present time' and that the infantry strength was 2,000 NCOs and men – of which only 869 were three-star privates. The defence assessment of 1957 posited dispatch of two infantry companies to UNEF Suez, then roughly equivalent to some 240 NCOs and men. In effect, about 12.5% of the total infantry strength would have been committed to UN service. In 1960, a report by the adjutant general put the total strength of NCOs and men of the Defence Forces at just under 6,000 other ranks and just under 1,000 officers. This was 40% below the established strength. The AG's report was submitted in Decem- ber 1960 at a time when both 32 & 33 Inf Bns were serving in the Congo – with some 1,400 officers, NCOs and men. This figure represents 20% of the 1960 total strength of 7,000 all ranks. The total strength of the Defence Forces in 1957 was also about 7,000 all ranks. Given the relative stability of those years, the in- fantry elements would have been similar. In 1957, the Dept of De- fence expressed concerns at committing two infantry companies to the UN, but by late-1960, two battalions had been committed. A three infantry company battalion organisation means that the actual commitment to the UN in December 1960 was three times greater than that proposed in 1957. Small wonder then, that General Mc Keown in his reflections in 1996 observed that: 'It was fantastic, and we said to hell with it whether they were pre- pared or not; it was worth it to give 700 men an opportunity of this experience. In fact, it was this very response that resulted in what a good few people, including myself, thought was a bit rash. This was the sending of a second battalion a few weeks later. The main prob- lem was here at home in the wake of sending 1,400 people abroad. Unquestionably, it was over-ambitious to send abroad so many of our 7,000-strong all ranks, Permanent Defence Force'. Irish Defence Forces' service in UN operations over a virtually unbroken 55-year period since 32 Inf Bn marched out to the Congo dressed in their bull's-wool uniforms, wearing their studded, leather boots with 'jam-jar' leggings and 1938 pattern webbing, and carrying their bolt-action ri- fles, was, and remains, a fantastic opportunity, a great adventure, an honourable experience. About the author: Dr. James McCafferty DSM, BA (Hons), PhD served in the Congo with 34, 36 & 39 Inf Bns. His PhD thesis 'Political and military aspects of the Irish Army's service with UN forces in the Congo 1960- 64' is based on research carried out in Ireland, Belgium, Britain, France, Portugal, USA and USSR. A copy of his thesis is lodged in Military Archives.

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