An Cosantóir

www.military.ie the defence forces magazine | 21 The Second Offset does not require the creation of new large industries, like shipbuild- ing or vehicle construction. Instead, as a sum of strategies, it focuses on smaller and com- plementary systems, anywhere from cybersecurity, to drones, to technology for drones, or new techniques in manufacturing such systems. It also looks at how the defence sector itself does innovation. So where does the military see it can deploy this technol- ogy and what advantages is it looking for? One of the current military centrepieces of the strategy that ensures global reach is the Prompt Global Strike System (PGSS). Envisioned as a conventional missile that allows the US Air Force to strike anywhere in the world within less than an hour, it is part of a larger architecture to counter new defence systems and can reach far into enemy territory. Also in development is the successor to the Global Hawk, the Triton, another new long-range strike bomber, and on the drawing board, a sixth-generation fighter. All are envisioned as high-threat environ- ment aircraft with probable autonomy. Planning to win a future conflict is not just occurring for the air but also at sea. Ad- dressing the increasing vulner- ability of aircraft carriers and their retreat from shore to sea has been deemed paramount. Details on doing this remain uncertain but it is exactly what the Second Offset seeks to solve. The creation of undersea infrastructure to facilitate or resupply vessels and subma- rines is also proposed, as are modified missiles for subma- rines, akin to the PGSS, and a new generation of stealthy ships, like the USS Zumwalt, capable of carrying futuristic weapons platforms such as railguns and lasers. Aside from the fanciful hardware, one of the primary objectives of the strategy is to create a closer relationship between Silicon Valley and the Pentagon. Tapping into the 'new stream of innovation' is a prior- ity for the Pentagon. Commercial ventures are also examined for potential innovation. For example, Googles' Project Loon to provide internet connectivity to the world, is strikingly similar to the capabilities sought by the US Air Force in countering the loss of satellites. Bridging the public-private divide and creating a sustainable model of innovation is challenging. Recent initiatives include the creation of the Innovation Advisory Board, consisting of 12 Silicon Valley executives to advise the Pentagon on choos- ing programmes, and the Defence Innovation Marketplace, for small business and stakeholders to interact with the military on projects. It is hoped that initiatives like these will not only help overcome cultural divides but also act as space where the military can reach out for solutions. However, the strategy is facing critics inside the military, some of whose criticism reflects experiences with conflict in Iraq and Af- ghanistan. They fear the US is preparing for a war it won't be fight- ing and developing weapons that will have no use five weeks into a conflict; that military budgets in these circumstances may favour the life-cycle cost of an autonomous vehicle over, for instance, a translator. These choices seem to already have been made in favour of procuring technological solutions to human problems. Delving deeper into this leads to a debate about scenario-based planning versus capability planning for future conflicts, and the balance between autonomous and human systems on the battle- field. Little focus or attention has been received on these conflict- ing views, at either a policy or strategic level. Separately, it must also be recognised that commercial R&D cycles alone can often fail to take account of the impact of technologies. Therefore, government, and sometimes the military itself, can fill an important role as the risk-taker. GPS, touchscreen technology, the internet, and even mass containerisation, have all been military programmes. Although, putting these technologies together as products has been the niche of companies such as Apple and Google and the commercial sector in general. The New Innovation Strategy seeks to inverse this process, grabbing the commercial technology and investing in it early. This approach represents a fundamental step away from the past and requires major cultural shifts on part of the military also. Predicting what future conflict will look like is notoriously dif- ficulty and consequently the New Innovation Strategy is sparse on detail but big on ambition. As it seeks to continue its role as the primary provider of world security in the 21st Century, the United States is facing challenges like all other great powers have before, and the stakes could not be higher. The prospect of a nuclear conflict with a rising power, such as China, makes one pause to realise what this means not for just international security but humanity. If the Pentagon fails in its new approach the US could take decades to recover its standing and credibility, as well as military prominence. This would have ripple effects for NATO and European security. On the contrary, if it succeeds it could be the dawn of another 'American Century', reinvigorating its military forces to face challenges in a truly global sense. robert Tarrant is a graduate of the university of aberdeen Strategic Studies programme and is a regular contributor to An Cosantóir. You can follow him on twitter @roberttarrnt2. AH-1Z Viper US Marine Attack Helicopter Bell AH-1 Cobra A Northrop Grumman deck operator, drives an X-47B unmanned combat air system Patriot is a long-range, high altitude, all-weather solution that has been rigorously tested more than 2,500 times with U.S. Army oversight under real- world conditions. © Raytheon

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