An Cosantóir

www.military.ie the defence forces magazine | 21 sions were set off by the attackers to distract the authorities and to bring the public out onto the streets. At 21.30 hours, the two attackers took several people hostage within the building. Police who confronted the attackers were outgunned and some withdrew back to their station. However, many others risked their lives in order to safeguard the public and apprehend the gunmen. Police Commissioner Hasan Gafoor ordered his men not to take on the gunmen, telling them to await the arrival of the National Security Guard (NSG), the elite anti-terrorist unit, from their base in Delhi, a three-hour flight away. Political and bureaucratic problems caused a 12-hour delay before this force arrived on the scene and began to take action. At 23.00 hours on 27th November NSG commandos launched an assault on Nariman House and rescued eight hostages. In the early hours of the following morning they manage to secure more hostages. At 07.00 hours they landed on the roof of the building via helicopter and stormed the building in force. Several people were killed, including the two attackers, in the ensuing fire-fight that ended the three-day siege. Between 09.35hrs and 09.48hrs, insurgents attacked the Taj Mahal palace, the Tower Hotel and the Oberoi Trident Hotel. Entering the buildings, the men moved slowly and systematically, firing into the crowded bars and restaurants. Grenade explosions and automatic fire echoed through the hotels as the attackers fired indiscriminately, walking through corridors, kicking open doors and firing into the rooms, executing guests, and lighting fires. Large fires broke in the hotels, trapping guests on the upper floors. Fire-fighters arrived and began rescuing those inside, using scaling ladders to reach the upper storeys. The NSG arrived at the scene and took control. As powerful explosions rocked the buildings, the commandos assaulted the hotels, securing the lobbies and immediately starting to clear the hotels, room by room; although inaccurate reports stating that all the attackers had been killed enabled the attackers to continue to evade the authorities. There were great acts of heroism and self sacrifice during the attacks, particularly by hotel staff who risked their lives to rescue guests from the burning building. At 1440hrs on November 28th, following further gun battles between the insurgents and special forces, the siege ended with the shooting dead of the last insurgents. Twelve coordinated gun and bomb attacks had resulted in ap- proximately 166 people (including nine attackers) being killed and more than 600 injured in the three-day killing spree. Intelligence services had failed to detect that such an attack was being planned. These surprise attacks are posing more and more problems for government forces as their surveillance opera- tives are failing to identify such operations and stop them before they begin. Indian security forces and government officials came under se- vere criticism for the way they reacted to the attacks. The police, taken by surprise, were ill trained and under equipped to deal with such a situation, and their chief, Hasan Gafoor, was slow to call out the NSG, who managed to take control of the situation and rescue many of the hostages. The attacks drew widespread global condemnation and raised questions over Pakistan's use of proxy terrorist groups to further its foreign policy in relation to jurisdiction over Kashmir. The one attacker that was captured later confessed that the attacks were conducted with the support of individuals within Pakistan. He was later executed for his part in the attacks. On 1st December, the Indian Foreign Ministry made a formal complaint to the Pakistani Ambassador that the attacks were carried out by Pakistani citizens. Though initially this was denied, Pakistani authorities later arrested a number of suspects. Investi- gations revealed that the attackers were in constant communica- tion with 'handlers' who were directing them to the targets and advising them who to kill. Terrorist cells were traced to America and Canada with two suspects being arrested in Chicago, Illinois. On 7th January 2009, Pakistan's information minister, Sherry Rehman, officially accepted that the captured gunman, Ajmal Kasab, was Pakistani, and also accepted that parts of the opera- tion had been planned in Pakistan. In the aftermath of the attacks, the Indian government pur- chased a number of patrol boats to police its shorelines. Police weapons were also to be upgraded and all personnel better trained to deal with such attacks. A new federal, anti-terrorist agency was to be established to co-ordinate action against ter- rorism and the Indian government requested better co-operation between world intelligence agencies, where information could be exchanged and analysed in order to prevent future attacks that may occur throughout the world. While such preventative measures are welcomed, it will take many years to repair India's fragile, and often volatile, relationship with Pakistan.

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