An Cosantóir

November 2016

An Cosantóir the official magazine of the Irish Defence Forces and Reserve Defence Forces.

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www.military.ie the defence forces magazine | 29 81mm mortars. Additionally, the Katangese had control of the road to Elisabethville, the Lufira, the road north, and, crucially, the water supply to the Irish position, which was cut-off during the siege. As the offensive action by Katangese forces against the Irish troops began on the morning of 13th September, A Coy were faced by vastly superior forces and were in a strategically untenable position to withstand sustained, pro- longed assaults. In the period between the first assault and the inevitable capitulation by A Coy on 18th September, two attempts were made to relieve the company by Irish and Indian forces from UN brigade HQ in Elisabethville. These attempts, known as Force Kane, were first assayed by one infantry company and then, at the second attempt, by two infantry companies plus one section of armoured cars in support. Robust defence of the road bridge and the destroyed rail bridge foiled both relief attempts to cross the otherwise impassable Lufira. There is no record of an attempt to co-ordinate a fighting breakout by A Coy with the relief efforts. One attempt to re-supply the besieged company by helicopter ended in the destruction, by a Fouga jet, of the aircraft on the ground at Jadotville. 35 Inf Bn signals log records that during the siege airdrop resupply by Douglas DC 3 or DC 4 was mooted on two occasions, but not executed. When, inevitably, A Coy's commander decided on 18th September that his troops could no longer resist the sustained assaults by Katangese ground and air forces and that capitula- tion was the best course open to him, it was because his troops' food, water and ammunition were virtually exhausted and the realisation that further resistance would lead to loss of life of members of his command. (At this point, it is salient to observe that despite five days of alternating fighting and temporary cease-fires, not a single Irish soldier had been killed while the post-action report of OC A Coy estimated Katangese losses of some 150 killed and 80 wounded.) In circumstances such as those obtaining at Jadotville at the time, a commander is faced with the dichotomy of 'fighting to the last man' or 'capitulating with honour'. The course chosen by OC A Coy ensured that his men survived and 'lived to fight another day' as the Irish troops that went into captivity on 18th Septem- ber, were released in prisoner exchange on 24th October and took part in renewed fighting with Katangese forces in December 1961. In total, 65 Distinguished Service Medals (DSMs) were awarded to Irish soldiers for service in the Congo. Of these, three were awarded to personnel involved in the Jadotville action. However, only one of these can positively be linked to Jadotville: the award to an NCO who took part in Force Kane relief efforts. The cita- tions for the other two DSMs, awarded to an officer (a platoon commander at Jadotville) and an NCO (a platoon sergeant at Jadotville), merely state that they were awarded for 'distinguished service in the Republic of the Congo, during September and De- cember 1961. In September 2016, 55 years after the events, presidential cita- tions were awarded for the action by A Company at Jadotville in September 1961. The details of the siege, the fighting and the attendant tempo- rary cease-fires, have been exhaustively analysed and discussed. This article did not set out to repeat those exercises, but to take a holistic overview of the siege and to extrapo- late lessons. The most significant lesson from the Siege of Jadotville is that a unit should never be placed in a position where it can- not be withdrawn, relieved, resupplied or reinforced. about the author: Dr McCafferty DSM, BA (Hons), PhD, served in the Congo with 34, 36 & 39 Inf Bns. His PhD thesis 'Political and military as- pects of the Irish Army's service with UN forces in the Congo 1960-64' is based on research carried out in Ireland, Belgium, Britain, France, Portugal, the USA and the USSR. A copy of the thesis is lodged in Military Archives. Members of 35 Inf Bn receive instruction on the 84mm Carl Gustaf Anti Tank weapon in the Congo 1961. Photo: Bernie Sweeney Lt Gen S Mac Eoin, Comander in Chief of UN Force in the Congo, presents senior members of staff to UN Secretary General Dag Hammerskjold. Members of A Coy, 35 Inf Bn beside a UN helicopter. Photo: Military Archives After the Battle, Purfina Garage Jadotville, Congo 1961. L/R: Kelly, Heffernan, Neville, Prendergast, Donnelly, Williams, Cuffe, Byrne & Donnelly. Photo: John Gorman

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