An Cosantóir

www.military.ie the defence forces magazine | 29 until 17th June that the Group had taken over the entire south Kasai sector, with an area of 6,000 sq miles to look after. 1 Inf Gp was responsible for guarding over 60 miles of impor- tant railway line that provided the main supply line from Elisa- bethville through Katanga and Kasai to Port Franqui. At least three times a week the unit provided train guards to protect hundreds of refugees travelling on the line, which ran along the borders of Baluba and Kanioka territories, and also between Lulua and Baluba tribes, who were traditional enemies. Any relaxation of vigilance could mean a flare-up of the tribal wars that had unhappily caused so many UN casualties a short time previously. 1 Inf Gp held the area for over two months, eventually occupy- ing posts previously occupied by a battalion with a recce squad- ron in support. The unit's posts were barbed-wire enclosures about the size of a football pitch, which they never left except to patrol in strength, living in primitive conditions under canvas and with a constant shortage of water; one post had to travel over five miles to collect their water in jerry cans. The Ghanaians had taken their transport with them and the Irish had to wait a considerable time for the arrival of UN replace- ments. In the meantime, the transport for one company, with two posts over seven miles apart, consisted of one jeep, two pick-ups and a bullet-riddled, five-ton truck. Roads were rutted tracks and after a few miles faces and clothes were covered with a thick coating of black-red dust. Loaded weapons were carried by all personnel at all times. Snakes were also plentiful; at one post four deadly mambas were killed in one day alone. By the time 1 Inf Gp was withdrawn to Kamina, south Kasai was considered a 'safe area' due to their efforts, and the UN garrison there was not replaced. When the last company was leaving Mwene-Ditu, the Minister of the Interior came to the railway station to address the Irish, telling them that they were welcome back to south Kasai at any time. At each station on their route deputations met the train and similar speeches were made. It was a testament to the Irish soldiers' efforts, given that two months before there had been a shooting war between local troops and UN personnel. On arrival in Kamina after four days travelling in dilapidated railway coaches, OC 1 Inf Gp took over as base commander and as commander of the NW sector of Katanga, an area over 100 sq miles previously occupied by a Nigerian brigade, and which included 100 Swedish troops. In addition to running the huge base and its outposts 1 Inf Gp also had to garrison Kilubi, 60 miles away, where a hydro-electric station supplied power to Kamina. With such a huge area there wasn't much time for rest but living conditions were excellent and the work was much easier. Strength on the base, including the Swedes, was roughly 300. Then, on August 27th 1 Inf Gp was handed two Katangan of- ficers to guard; one a French mercenary. The next day, captured mercenaries started to roll in from the rest of Katanga and in a short time they had 150 under guard, along with 27 others they had rounded up in their own area. These mercenaries were tough and unpredictable; a roving army of 'guns for hire' who had fought in Korea, Indo-China, Palestine, Europe, and Cuba. From 2nd September the Irish unit also had to send a nightly patrol of 50 into Kaminaville, 30km away. Along with all the extra duties and extra guards, the situation meant that trouble was almost inevitable. It duly arrived. On the night of September 12th 'stand-to' was ordered. There were 14 roads and a railway line leading into the base and it had been acknowledged that it would require a brigade to success- fully defend Kamina, a town whose importance was recognised in the saying "who holds Kamina holds Katanga". With small num- bers, the best Lt Col O'Donovan could do was to man strategic strong points around the base and scramble the mobile reserve. Reports coming in of enemy strength were of 1,200 troops, equipped with long-range mortars, and eight Saracens armed with 57mm cannons, twin machine-guns, and .5" machine guns; completely out-gunning the Irish unit. The enemy also had a re- serve of 2,500 troops in the Kaminaville sector and it was claimed that they could arm 20,000 tribesmen. On the afternoon of September 14th they attacked. The first wave came up against a strong point manned by 29 Swedes with an Irish mortar section in support. This attack was broken up and the 84mm knocked out two Saracens. Irish mortar fire also blew up an enemy ammunition truck containing about five tons of mortar rounds and small-arms ammunition. Lt Col O'Donovan quickly deployed his mobile reserve and further attacks were broken up as they arose. Probing tactics, sniping and mortar fire continued from the edge of the jungle, but men and weapons ONUC Irish contingent troops en-route to the airport on the first leg of their journey to Elizabethville, where fighting has broken out. 1st December 1961. © UN Photo

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