An Cosantóir

www.military.ie the defence forces magazine | 29 at platoon strength and supported by two Grey- hound armoured cars, which, equipped with a 37mm cannon and two .300 Browning MMGs, had superior firepower to the UN's Ferret scout cars. Despite freedom of movement being one of their mission's key principles and tasks, the UN forces did not respond to this provocation. From 29th August Kamina Air Base was utilised by the UN as a holding-point for mercenaries who had been arrested elsewhere in Katanga, and by 14th September all those arrested and their families had been repatriated or deported to Belgium. Early on 14th September, Katangese forces placed a further roadblock/strongpoint on the Kaminaville road. The new position was closer to the air base than the earlier one and was manned by two platoons of Gendarmerie sup- ported by six Greyhound armoured cars. As a counter measure, the Base Commander immediately deployed platoon-strength ele- ments to dig-in on all approach roads to Kamina Air Base and also on the rail link, as it was be- lieved that the Katangese had an armoured train at Kaminaville. A mobile reserve of two platoons with a section of two 84mm Carl Gustaf recoil- less rifles was established, supported by the two Ferret scout cars. This prescient response by the Irish com- mander enabled his forces to stoutly repel the first Katangan attack, mounted at 16.30hrs on 14th September along the Kaminaville to Kamina road. The attacking force comprised two platoons, sup- ported by two Greyhounds and mortars. Return fire from Irish, Swedish and Indian troops swiftly repelled the attack, with the Katangese suffering an estimated 20 dead and 30 wounded. The two Greyhound armoured cars and an ammunition truck were also destroyed by the Irish-manned 84mm recoilless rifles. The UN forces did not suffer any casualties. As darkness fell on the evening of 14th Sep- tember, a damage assessment revealed that the main radio transmitter at Base 2 had been destroyed by Katangese mortar fire. However, the radio installation at the airfield control tower was undamaged. The Base Commander then ordered the evacuation of all non-military UN personnel to Base 1 and the cutting of the rail link to Kamina. The next day, robust probing attacks by Ka- tangese forces at several points around both bases commenced and a Katangese Fouga jet began strafing and bombing runs over the air base. The air attacks continued twice a day until 18th September and in lieu of anti-aircraft weapons Irish artillery officers from 1 Inf Gp modified the Vickers machine gun tripods to allow fire at a greater- than-normal elevation. These modifications, although rendering the Vickers more liable to jamming, and the use of interspersed tracer rounds in the ammunition belts forced the Fouga pilots to fly at an increased height, making their attacks less accurate. Nevertheless, the Fouga attacks destroyed one UN DC 3 aircraft on the ground and injured two ground crew. The probing attacks on the ground persisted for a week but none were successful and Kamina Air Base remained securely in UN hands. The electricity supply to Kamina came from a hydroelectric station at Kilubi, some 30km away, which was protected by an infantry platoon from 1 Inf Gp. These troops also succeeded in repelling a series of at- tacks over several days by Katangese forces. However, the power lines to Kamina were cut on 16th September when the Katangese blew up a pylon. No longer needed at the power station, the Irish platoon was withdrawn by helicopter to Kamina on the night of 19th/20th September where they took part in the continuing defence of the air base, which was then operating on stand-by power generators. At 23:59 hours on 21th September a Katanga-wide ceasefire was agreed between UN and Katangese forces, coupled with a return to the status quo ante-bellum. While the losses to the Katangese engaged in attacking the air base and power station are unknown, the combined UN force of Irish, Swedish, Indian and Malaysian soldiers lost no one. Available records are not specific as to the roles played by Irish troops per se in this week-long engagement. However, as the defence was under the command and control of an Irish officer and staff- officers, and Irish soldiers formed about half of the combined UN force, their part was undoubtedly significant in, and contributory to, securing this strategically critical UN asset. Following the cessation of hostilities, the Irish Minister for External (Foreign) Affairs, Mr Frank Aiken, visited the Irish at Kamina on 22nd September during his tour of inspection of Irish troops in the Congo. As the DC 3 aircraft carrying the minister came in to land it overshot the runway and the left undercarriage leg collapsed. Despite this un- fortunate landing, Mr Aiken inspected the guard-of-honour, toured Irish positions at Kamina, and took tea with the Base Commander and his officers before departing that evening for Elisabethville. On 9th October 1 Inf Gp was redeployed from Kamina to new posi- tions in North Katanga, at Nyunzu and Niemba, where they remained until the unit was repatriated at the end of November 1961. About the author: Dr McCafferty served in the Congo with 34, 36 & 39 Inf Bns. His PhD thesis 'Political and military aspects of the Irish Army's service with UN forces in the Congo 1960-64' is based on research using sources in Ireland, Belgium, Britain, France, Portugal, USA and USSR. A copy of his thesis is lodged in Military Archives.

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