An Cosantóir

June 2017

An Cosantóir the official magazine of the Irish Defence Forces and Reserve Defence Forces.

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An Cosantóir June 2017 www.dfmagazine.ie 36 | By TOM BURKE A t 0310hrs on 7th June 1917, 100 years ago this year, Ulster loyalists and Irish nationalists fought side by side to capture the German-occupied Flemish village of Wijtschate, or, as the men called it, 'Whitesheet'. Some believed this battle presented an opportunity for reconciliation between the Unionist and nationalist traditions in Ireland. the think- ing was that if Irishmen could fight and die together, surely they could live together. The symbolism of these Irishmen fight- ing side by side was not lost on some Nationalist politicians. In December 1916, Willie Redmond MP, who served as a major in the 6th Royal Irish Regiment, wrote to his friend Sir Arthur Conan Doyle: "There are a great many Irishmen today who feel that out of this war we should try to build up a new Ireland. The trouble is, men are so timid about meeting each other half way. It would be a fine memo- rial to the men who have died so splen- didly, if we could, over their graves build a bridge between north and south." Ever since his appointment as GOC of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in late December 1915, General Sir Douglas Haig had ambitions for breaking out of the Ypres Salient, which had come about by default following the end of the War of Movement in late 1914 and the end of the Second Battle of Ypres in May 1915. There were sound strategic reasons for his breakout ambitions. A sweep north-east from Ypres to the Belgian coast, with the objective of capturing the German-held Belgian ports of Ostend and Zeebrugge, from which German U Boats were operating and inflicting massive losses on Allied shipping, would offer far better strategic gains to the BEF than a sweep north of the Somme facing well- fortified German-occupied villages beyond which was of little or no strategic value. Total British Merchant Navy ship- ping losses in January 1917 were 49 ships (153,666 tons). In February, losses had more than doubled amounting to 105 ships (313,486 tons). By April losses had risen to 450 ships (1,365,912 tons); losses so severe that First Sea-Lord Admiral Sir John Jellico informed Haig that 'if the army cannot get the Belgian ports, the Navy cannot hold the Channel and the war is lost'. Moreover, the capture of the railhead at Roulers (now Roeselare) would cut the German supply line to their armies in Flanders. The failure of the Somme offensive in November 1916 and the Nivelle offensive in April 1917 gave Haig an opportunity to implement his breakout plan in the sum- mer of 1917. However, before any major advances out of Ypres towards Ostend, Zeebrugge or Roulers could be made, the Wijtschate and Messines Ridge, behind which Ger- man artillery was a real threat to the breakout, had to be taken first. The battle, or series of sub-battles, to break out from the Ypres salient in the summer and autumn of 1917 was of- ficially referred to as the Third Battle Ypres, or later simply as Passchendaele. If Passchendaele was a three-act stage drama, then the Battle of Wijtschate and Messines would be Act One, Scene One. The task to take Wijtschate and Mes- sines Ridge in June 1917 was handed to the Second Army in Flanders under the command of General Sir Herbert Plumer. The ruined villages of Wijtschate and Messines were assigned to the Second Army's IX Corps, comprising the 19th (Western), the 16th (Irish) and 36th (Ul- ster) Divisions. The northern end of the ridge was assigned to X Corps and the southern end was to II ANZAC Corps. Placing the 16th (Irish) and 36th (Ul- ster) Divisions side by side in the order of attack on Wijtschate was no coinci- dence. Essentially the placement was one of several initiatives taken by the War Office in an attempt to stem the fall in British Army recruitment in Ireland. In late September 1916, Adjutant General to the Forces Sir Nevil Macready stated that Irish infantry units were 17,194 men below strength. Between August 1914 and August 1916, recruitment in Ireland had dropped from 50,107 to 9,323, and by February 1917 it had fallen further, to General Sir Herbert Plumer, commander of the British Second Army. Photo: Imperial War Museum

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