An Cosantóir

An Cosantóir September 2017 www.dfmagazine.ie 30 | these aircraft are not given in the 38 IrBatt unit history. Other UN forces in Elisabethville com- prised an Ethiopian battalion, a Tunisian battalion and three Indian battalions: 4th Rajputani Rifles, 2/5 Ghurkhas and 4th Madras Rifles. The weaponry of these UN forces is not recorded, nor is the strength of UN air assets in Elisabethville. In Camp Prince Leopold Farm, 38 IrBatt was engaged in ground and helicopter recon- naissance, trenching works and weapons training. The battalion included a troop of 120mm heavy mortars – the largest calibre weapon used by the Irish army in the Congo. Remarkably, almost without exception the personnel of this troop were drawn from the same parent unit - 4 Field Artillery Regiment from Mullingar, Co Westmeath. The tense blockade in Elisabethville persisted until Christmas Eve, 1962, when Katangese gendarmerie opened fire on UN positions. Later that day a UN helicopter was shot down, killing six members of the Indian UN contingent. 38 IrBatt went on alert, but no further incidents occurred un- til the night of 27th/28th December, when heavy small-arms and mortar fire erupted from Katangese positions and water and electricity supplies to the Irish camp were cut off. 38 IrBatt took up defensive posi- tions and doubled-manned all guard posts. On 28th December, the president of Katanga, Moise Tshombe, made an abor- tive attempt to stop his own forces firing: this attempt failed, and Indian UN troops in brigade strength commenced a series of attacks. The Irish 120mm heavy mortar troop was detached to the Indian brigade during this phase of operations directed against radio communication centres and gendarmerie positions. In addition, two Irish Ford armoured cars were detached to the Ethiopian battalion, which was engaged in opening the road from Elisabethville towards the town of Kipushi, and a subsequent assault on the town, which lies on the border with Zambia, about 25km southwest of Elisabethville. The strategic significance of the assault on Kipushi is not recorded, although the ordnance report in the 38 IrBatt unit history details the discovery and destruction of 'eight hundred and sixty eight aerial rocket bombs' found at Kipushi airfield. While no reference is made to any Katangese mili- tary aircraft being found at this airfield, it may be deduced that the action against Kipushi had the strategic aim of capturing the airfield and any military equipment there. The role of 38 IrBatt in this attack was to act as a reserve and to reinforce the Ethiopian troops. The Kipushi operation began on 29th December and concluded on the morn- ing of 30th December when 38 IrBatt passed through Ethiopian lines, advanced on Kipushi and 'Having met a truce party about one mile short of the town, the bat- talion entered the town peacefully'. For the next several weeks, 38 IrBatt, supported by their armoured car group (less one section detached to the Ethiopian battalion), occupied Kipushi, attending to the needs of many refugees, maintaining law and order and taking over abandoned gendarmerie stores of weapons, ammuni- tion, mines and explosives. The Irish heavy mortar troop detached to the Indian brigade had been in continu- ing action in Elisabethville before moving to support the Ethiopian battalion on an attack on a gendarmerie strongpoint, known as 'Simba Hill', en route to Kipushi. At the conclusion of the latter action, the heavy mortar troop supported their own Irish battalion as they closed on Kipushi. Following the Kipushi operation, the heavy mortar troop was moved back to the Indian brigade as they assaulted Jadot- ville and then Kolwezi. This meant that the men who manned the 120mm mortars were in action on a continuous basis from 28th December 1962 to 21st January 1963. In this period 38 IrBatt's heavy mortar troop fired a total of 225 rounds. The battalion's unit history describes their effect: The devastating effect of the 120mm mortar on the Katangese gendarmerie has been borne out at all stages of the opera- tion. The efficiency of the 38 Battalion Heavy Mortar Troop and its application to duty has been evidenced in the many public statements and citations given by all concerned. The report of the heavy mortar troop in the unit history lists a number of conclu- sions, intended as guidance for future op- erations on the basis of 'lessons learned'. The main points were the importance of highly-skilled crews and that each gun- towing vehicle should be capable of also carrying ammunition. (The Land Rover vehicles used by 38 IrBatt were not power- Armoured vehicles of the 38th Irish Battalion seen securing the roadway between Elisabethville and Kipushi. 3rd January 1963. UN Photo/BZ #105775 Irish troops are seen guarding the Banque du Congo in Kolwezi. 1st March 1963. UN Photo #105709

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