An Cosantóir

www.military.ie the defence forces magazine | 37 (9-12km), with the exception of Flesquieres where the German defenders held the line and knocked out an estimated 40 tanks with their artillery. The unit holding this sector had experience in fighting tanks as they had faced French tanks during the Niv- elle Offensive. Poor co-ordination between infantry and tanks also proved problematic and enabled the Germans to delay the advance in this sector throughout the day before deciding to pull out of Flesquieres under cover of darkness. Fighting was fierce around Bourlon and Anneau with German counter-attacks forcing the British to withdraw. This moving back and forth continued throughout the battle in many areas and British reserves were quickly depleted as General Byng had used much of his force in the initial assaults. By 1600hrs on the first day the initial battle had been won by the Allies, but there were no reserves of vehicles, crews or infan- try to consolidate their gains and German reinforcements were being rushed to the area. The task of knocking out the tanks fell to the individual soldier using grenades and flamethrowers, as anti-tank weapons or a designated tank-killer unit were non-existent at the time. In some places anti-aircraft guns were modified for use against the tanks and mounted on trucks to pursue them. British progress slowed as the battle raged. By November 28th the British had reached a position on the crest of the Bourlon Ridge, where they held the salient. Two days later, the Germans launched a major counter-offensive, utilising intense artil- lery fire and new infantry tactics that made use of infiltrating small groups of 'storm troops'. Unable to hold their newly taken positions, the British were forced to withdraw from their salient, leaving them just with the gains they had made around the villages of Havincourt, Ribecourt and Flesquieres. The great breakthrough had been squan- dered due to the lack of reserves. The brief and often overlooked Battle of Cambrai ended in bitter disappointment for the British. The blame for the failure of the attack, as happened so often during the war, was levelled against junior officers and NCOs. This accusation was unjust as it was the front-line officers who had warned senior commanders that a German counter-attack was imminent and that without proper reserves they could not hold their positions. During the Spring Offensive of 1918, German forces continued with the tactic of breaking through defences with small mobile teams of heavily armed storm troopers that they had first employed at Cambrai. However, this offensive did not succeed because the Germans lacked the mobility to exploit their attacks and create a deep penetration of the British lines. In the aftermath of the war, while many military command- ers realised that tanks and motorised infantry were the key to sustaining a breakthrough, the British High Command failed to recognise their potential. To compound this error, during the 1930s a parsimonious Parliament and a pacifist sentiment deprived the army of the weapons and train- ing needed to develop tank warfare. In contrast, German military commanders developed and advocated the strategy of concentrating armoured formations at the point of at- tack to achieve deep penetration of enemy lines, based on the principles of surprise, deployment in mass and the use of suitable terrain. As a result, in 1940, 23 years af ter tanks had proved their wor th at Cambrai, German panzers formed the spearhead of the devastating Blitzkrieg unleashed on an unsuspecting world.

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