An Cosantóir

22 | KFOR overall strength of the Force now stands at 5,600, slightly over 10% of it's original 50,000 in 1999. It is made up of 22 NATO and eight non-NATO countries, the latter operating under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) arrangement. The Force is here as a 'deterrent pres- ence' under a UN mandate (SCR 1244) to provide 'a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for all'. The operational situation is given as 'calm and stable' south of the Ibar river and 'tense and fragile' in the Serb-dominated region north of the Ibar. In late July last year, while attempting to forcefully implement Committed to Progress W BY LT COL DAN HARVEY PHOTOS BY KFOR CHRONICLE PHOTOGRAPHER e, the Irish in Kosovo Force (KFOR), remain a small contingent of 12 (five officers and seven NCOs), all based in Staff Sections within KFOR HQ in Pristina. The customs policies at the northern crossing points of the Administra- tive Boundary Line with Serbia proper, the authorities in Kosovo de- ployed members of the Regional Operations Support Unit (ROSU), a specialised police component, to take control of the Jarinje (Gate 1) and Brnjak (DOG 31) boundary crossing points. Serbs living in the area reacted by erecting barricades on many of the main roads. In addition, alternative routes over rough paths and remote tracks were utilised or constructed to bypass the two boundary crossings and allow traffic to cross unchecked into and out of Serbia. Local leaders were adamant that they had no desire to toler- ised by the challenge of either tolerating or confronting restrictions on freedom of movement that occurred in northern Kosovo. The barricades and the complex context within which they stood were a severe test of KFOR's resolve. However, from early on, it was iden- tified that this intricate issue was only one symptom of a severe political burden stemming from the past conflict. In spite of all the complexities, KFOR adopted a clear and deter- ate the establishment of a fully functioning customs regime and many Serbs living in the northern part of Kosovo saw the ROSU ac- tion as a provocative attempt to impose a 'state border' between them and Serbia proper. An Cosantóir November 2012 www.dfmagazine.ie mined approach to the barricades. Freedom of movement is a key principle for the international community. The obstructive actions of a minority of individuals - at times out of sheer self-interest - could not go unchallenged. Also, these obstructions became an im- pediment to progress towards the improvement of the daily lives of people living in the affected areas. KFOR reacted professionally, the locals rejected this effort to establish a functioning customs regime and a confrontation followed, in which one ROSU mem- ber was killed. Subsequent to an initial calming of the situation tensions flared again two days later when a masked group burned down the Jarinje crossing point. Major tensions followed, with KFOR troops confronted by roadblocks and road blockers, many of whom were woman, children and the elderly. Although KFOR succeeded in taking control of some of these barricades using surprise and swiftness, serious clashes occurred over the following months as a small group of individuals reacted violently, using fire- arms and grenades. KFOR's response was resolute and a series of planned roadblock-removal and bypass-blocking operations proved successful, while the focus at all times was not to cause casualties. Undoubtedly, the last twelve-month period was one character- In like manner to their rejection of the institutions in Kosovo,

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