An Cosantóir

www.military.ie the defence forces magazine | 21 As the load increases, it causes the individual's head to lean forward with the result that personnel look at the ground more, therefore not observing their arcs and ultimately reduc- ing situational awareness. Similarly, as a soldier becomes increasingly overloaded, there is a negative impact upon his/ her ability to move quickly around the battlefield; so bounds are likely to be longer, thus exposing troops to enemy fire for greater periods. Similarly the ability to jump, climb, crawl, sprint, etc, will also be diminished. The USMC has also proven, through weighted tests on range practices, that marksmanship standards fall as the load carried is increased. In addition, heavier loads result in greater energy expendi- ture, which means more sustainment supplies must be carried, thus increasing the load. Through experimentation, the Australian Army found that an extra 10kg carried would reduce marching speed by 0.5km/ hr while maintaining the same energy expenditure; doubling the external load from 20kg to 40kg, while walking over hard flat terrain at 3.0km/hr, increases energy expenditure by 29%; and doubling walking speed from 3.0 to 6.0km/hr, while marching with a load over hard, flat terrain, increases energy expenditure by 132%. Not only can this result in thermal stress, but the associated additional fluid requirements may also increase the load an individual must carry. Conversely, in the cold, personnel expend energy shivering and need to consume – and therefore carry – additional food supplies. Additional clothing to keep warm will add to the total external load, which again causes more energy to be expended. Fight Light is a concept and a function of mission command, not a series of proscriptive packing lists. Individual units/train- ing establishments will decide what kit is carried as a mini- mum, but the goal should always be to strive for only mission- essential items. The concept requires commanders at all levels to adopt an imaginative and flexible mind-set throughout the estimate process and execution of their plan, when considering what equipment their soldiers need to achieve mission success. Simply put, a soldier should pack to task. The kit required for a FIBUA assault on a small town with a supporting road network is vastly different to that required on an insertion march over mountainous terrain devoid of metalled roads or tracks. Through thorough terrain analysis, commanders should identify routes and road networks that support the scheme of manoeuvre and facilitate the forward movement of kit/equip- ment as the operation progresses. By employing light utility vehicles, company sergeants can ensure the right kit is in the right place at the right time; supporting their commanders to achieve the mission. An individual load carriage capacity can broadly be catego- rised into three groups: personal characteristics (fitness, body mass, gender, age, injury profile, load carriage experience); task characteristics (total external load, distribution of load, load carriage equipment design, movement speed, march duration, work-to-rest ratio); and environment (terrain, heat, humidity, altitude). In some situations some of these factors may be con- trolled, marching speeds, for example, while others, such as ambient temperature, cannot. When conducting their estimate process it is important for commanders to consider the factors influencing load carriage ca- pacity and identify the likely burden. This information will guide the duration of operations, work/rest schedules, total load limits, and replenishment and logistic support requirements. Once the commander has established what mission-critical equipment is to be carried, he/she then applies the 'DROP' drill. Decide the level of tactical mobility required by the troops, set against the expected duration/resupply considerations for the mission. Reduce all unnecessary equipment; moving kit to main back- pack or daysack as required. organise a means to bring forward the equipment the soldiers will require later, but will not carry on the operation, through the use of a light utility vehicle, for example. Police the ranks, by conducting kit checks to ensure that troops are complying with the load policy for this particular operation and task. Load carriage should always be based on a mission-specific approach in order to ensure 'just enough' kit is carried, com- pared to the over-burdened or 'just in case' approach. There may be times where soldiers will have to carry heavy loads while patrolling across remote terrain without a supporting road network, or in situations where they have to wait until a supporting effort's objective is secured prior to their kit being safely moved forward. But by embracing Fight Light, these sit- uations are kept to the minimum, and units can become more adaptive and responsive to changing tactical situations during operations while still ensuring they are sustained throughout, and ready to transition to future operations at short notice. The NCOTW will be publishing guidance on Fight Light in coming months, and employing Fight Light and the DROP drill during career courses such as the all-arms standard NCO course, and the infantry platoon sergeants course. Units can also immediately employ the Fight Light concept during their own collective training, and make use of light utility vehicles where available.

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