An Cosantóir

June 2018

An Cosantóir the official magazine of the Irish Defence Forces and Reserve Defence Forces.

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An Cosantóir June 2018 www.dfmagazine.ie 54 | By lT COl DAN hARVEy (RETD) I t was an abrupt assault, an abrasive action, and an able and assertive attack. The simplicity of Comdt (later Brig gen) Dave Taylor's (RIP) contingency plan to take full con- trol of the village of At Tiri had an enabling integrity about it. he knew that in order to have the final say the Irish needed to make a significant play. The sudden, sharp sortie against the De Facto Forces (DFF) half-track, followed by a fast and determined drive into the centre of the village, all stemmed from a weeklong refusal to lose the village to the Israeli- backed Christian militiamen of the self-styled South lebanese Army (SlA). Comdt Taylor caused events to happen faster than the DFF could react to them, and while in the end there was a com- posure in the collective effort of the Irish and their UN allies, it was every bit as much about individual acts of bravery, courage, leadership and resourcefulness. The Irish had retaken the village but knew this was not the end of the matter. They quickly readied themselves for the likely DFF reaction and it was not long in coming. A week previously, something very wrong had suddenly developed at the east end of At Tiri on Sunday 6th April 1980 when, using surprise, speed, numerical strength, and the as- sistance of a half-track, a DFF party succeeded in forcing their way through the Irish checkpoint 6-15A. Once through, they moved into the outskirts of the village. Jumping from their vehicles, they took up positions inside local houses on both sides of the road, and commandeered a building close to the checkpoint, known as 'The Outhouse'. Lt Tom Aherne quickly realised that the DFF now controlled all vehicle access inside the village. His platoon HQ at Post 6-15B (nicknamed 'Wuthering Heights') was cut off and could only be reached by foot. The Outhouse and the checkpoint were occupied by the DFF and the less prominent listening post 6 - 15B, at the western edge of the village, was cut off, but still in radio contact. Major Haddad, the DFF leader, wanted At Tiri not for itself but as a springboard from which to take the strategically important Hill 880, with its commanding views providing dominant fields of fire into the Irish AO. His plans to seize At Tiri outright were however frustrated by the Irish platoon's reaction; in particular Cpl Gaffney's sug- gestion to block the back road to Hill 880 and Lt Aherne's subsequent deployment of two 84mm anti-tank gun crews for that purpose. The DFF had made a mistake, a seri- ous one. Instead of securing the junction granting access to Hill 880 when they had the opportunity, they had gone straight for the village. Lt Aherne's response was to 'close the gate behind them' as it were, reseal the checkpoint, reinforce it and add barbed wire for good measure. Meanwhile, troops in platoon HQ deployed to secure their post's perimeter. The DFF had gained ground and the initiative, but the Irish had contained their incursion; the result was an uneasy standoff. Within a half hour Irish reserves arrived from C Coy HQ in Haddatha, followed by elements from Recce Coy. The entire battalion was go- ing into full alert. Negotiation failed to bring a withdrawal of the DFF, and the Irish determination not to be intimidated frustrated the DFF, whose loss of patience manifested itself in further aggression, during which 21-year-old Pte Stephen Griffin from Galway was critically wounded. Capt Adrian Ainsworth and medic Pte John Daly valiantly recovered Pte Griffin under fire but sadly he would die from his wounds a week later. During the tense standoff over the next number of days there were further instances of aggression and shooting from the DFF. Sherman tanks were moved forward as an act of intimidation before being withdrawn, and villagers were rounded up and forced to confront the Irish, throwing stones and rolling burning tyres into the Irish positions, while being urged on from behind by the DFF, and physical confrontations and fistfights took place between Irish troops and militiamen. However, the Irish didn't budge. Throughout the standoff DFF th th

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