An Cosantóir

An Cosantóir July/August 2018 www.dfmagazine.ie 18 | By CoMDt gAVIn EgERton, oIC & CI nCotW A ccording to Defence Forces leadership doctrine NCOs are 'the glue that holds the organisation together and the oil that keeps the cogs moving' (DFDM – J2). In other words they are the lifeblood of the Defence Forces' middle manage- ment. If this is true, we should do more to empower NCOs and encourage initiative at that level. This requires commanders to devolve decision-making authority to junior leaders and encour- age a flexible and dynamic approach to problem solving. The answer to this is 'mission command'. Mission command is the command and leadership philosophy formally employed by the Defence Forces and it is referenced in Defence Forces leadership doctrine, as 'a philosophy of command that promotes decentralised command, freedom and speed of action and initiative, but is responsive to superior direction' (DFDM – J1). The US Army's pamphlet on mission command (ADRP 6-0) de- fines the philosophy as "The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations." In simple terms, mission command allows subordinate leaders to execute their mission with as much freedom as possible where the commander, through issuing clear commander's intent (a concise statement by the command- er of his/her identified purpose) and control measures, has told subordinates what to do but not how to do it. The Defence Forces leadership doctrine recognises that in order for mission command to work there needs to be five key elements present: unity of ef- fort, trust, mutual understanding, timely and effective decision making, and decentralised execution. So, where did mission command originate? In the late 18th and early 19th centuries the Prussian Army was internationally renowned for its military prowess and success, particularly under Frederick the Great, who insisted on strict obedi- ence to detailed orders in battle. Following a shattering defeat by Napoleon at the twin battles of Jena and Auerstedt in 1806, the Prussian leadership was forced to rethink its doctrine. Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian general and military theorist, analysed the defeat in an attempt to identify what made Napoleon's tactics su- perior. He found that amongst Napoleon's many attributes was a willingness to allow initiative from his subordinates and a flexible approach to battle; quite a stark contrast to the Prussian model. Following Clausewitz's death, one of his disciple's, General Helmut Graf Von Moltke, adopted much of his former mentor's teachings. Von Moltke, who is An Cosantóir July/August 2018 www.dfmagazine.ie 18 |

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