An Cosantóir

www.military.ie THE DEFENCE FORCES MAGAZINE | 21 The arrival of the Black and Tans in March 1920 changed the entire complexion of the war. Collins viewed the Black and Tans and the terror that came with them, as a mixed blessing as they clearly drove any doubting nationalists into the arms of Sinn Féin. He wrote in a letter to Donal Hayes: 'Apart from the loss which these attacks entail, good is done, as it makes clear and clearer to people what both sides stand for.' The Black and Tans' appearance in Dublin altered the whole view of the city. Kathleen Napoli McKenna, who worked on The Irish Bulletin, and saw Collins almost daily, wrote of what a Sun- day morning in Dublin looked like. Instead of empty streets with only Mass-goers about, '…citizens were thronging to hear Mass through streets filled with British Regulars carrying rifles with fixed bayonets, Auxiliary Cadets, Black and Tans and here and there, broad-shouldered plainclothesmen distinguishable as members of the 'G' Division of the Dublin Metropolitan Police engaged in politi- cal espionage. A tank was ambling along Bachelor's Walk, military lorries, filled with armed-to-the-teeth troops, their rifles at the ready, were racing through O'Connell St, and military cordons were drawn with barbed wire around entrances from Grafton St, from Nassau St and College Green.' Collins's plans were working well; the IRA would ambush a pa- trol, and a few hours later Crown forces would arrive in strength to shoot, burn and loot. They acted as if all the whole population was against them, so they didn't bother to differentiate – to be Irish was to be guilty. Nothing could have brought the people over to the nationalist side more completely. In essence, the people were driven into the arms of the IRA – which was exactly what Collins envisaged when he set out to provoke the confrontation. Dublin developed into a bloody battleground. During the day, IRA volunteers kept up the pressure by attacking patrols, raiding post offices, and shooting key men in the British intelligence ser- vices. After dark, British murder squads went out in the compara- tive safety of curfew to shoot at will. Collins was deeply conscious of the sufferings of the popula- tion, but he realised that these tactics must go on. With few men, and little ammunition, he knew he could not beat the Brit- ish by force, but he could and would defeat them through their own conduct. Collins was one of the first guerrilla leaders to recognise the potential of what is now known as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), directing James O'Donovan in 1919 to develop an explosive that was sufficiently powerful and could be distributed to units throughout the country, but that 'men with no technical skill could produce in a farmhouse kitchen… They have to be fairly foolproof because we can't have people all over the country hav- ing their heads blown off!' From autumn 1920 the IRA began to use IEDs in ambushes with regularity. Of 172 ambushes reported in the British War Diaries from then until the Truce in July 1921, 109 used explosive devices of some sort. By spring 1921 the IRA were a force in Dublin and its flying columns were feared throughout Cork, Kerry and Clare. However a lack of ammunition was becoming an issue, and though a formidable opponent, the IRA was not able to dislodge the British forces. It became clear to Collins that the Irish could not defeat those forces in the field. What set Collins apart from others was that he was always thinking not just of war, but also of peace and how to achieve it as quickly and advantageously as possible. Collins's views on violence were carefully considered. He said he had 'strong fighting ideas, or I should say, I suppose, ideas of the utility of fighting'. Above all, though, Collins was a realist. He was al- ways concerned about shaping public opinion and about the political impact of violence. He knew that sooner or later the Irish were going to have to negotiate with the British – and smarter men would do it sooner rather than later. Collins always said he was 'a soldier, not a politician'. In fact, he was neither – he was an administrative genius, able to compartmen- talise all matters and keep them separate and he ran a whole revolution as though it was a business concern. About the Author: Joseph E.A. Connell, Jnr a native of the USA is the au- thor of a num- ber of books on Dublin and its revolutionary history and contributes a regular column to History Ireland. His latest books include Michael Collins: Dublin 1916-22 (2017), and Who's Who In The Dublin Rising 1916 (2015), pub- lished by Wordwell Books www.wordwellbooks.com Michael Collins at a rally in 1922. British military index card created for Michael Collins. © John McGuiggan Michael Collins: Dublin 1916-22 (2017) by Joseph E.A. Connell, Jnr

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