An Cosantóir

An Cosantóir September 2019 www.dfmagazine.ie 28 | For the first two years of the conflict (1593-4), the English did not even realise they were at war as Tyrone fought a proxy war in Fermanagh and northern Connacht, using Hugh Maguire to focus English military attention in the west while Tyrone influenced, intimidated, and, where necessary, assassinated the crown's Irish allies in Ulster. All the while, as Tyrone pretended to be a loyal sub- ject, his military, political and economic strength grew. In February 1595 he openly broke with the Crown when he took the Blackwater Fort on the Armagh/Tyrone border, and in May, when Tyrone brought the full force of his army to bear at the Battle of Clontibret, the English officers were shocked at the skill, order and disciplined firepower of Tyrone's modernised infantry. The Eng- lish army was mauled but escaped to Newry, though the muster master, Sir Ralph Lane, thought it unwise to report the full extent of the casualties. Tyrone had put into the field something altogether new, and the crown's officers were struggling to find an answer to the new, modernised Irish forces. Throughout the sixteenth century, old weapons had given way to what later became known as the military revolution. Troops armed with firearms supported by armoured pikemen came to dominate the battlefields of Europe. These changes made their way to Ireland, as English soldiers gradually adopted the European reforms. Though the Irish were famous for their kerne and gal- lowglass, Irish lords in Connacht took advantage of the windfall of arms and equipment and more importantly, military expertise, when the survivors of the ill-fated Spanish Armada washed ashore in September 1588. A revolt by the O'Flahertys and Bourkes in Connacht pitted the re-equipped Irish forces against government infantry formations, but they were crushed with little difficulty. Clearly Tyrone was not just creating copies of English or even continental pike and shot units. What he had raised was much more worrying for the crown. Superficially, Tyrone's men resembled English infantry. Indeed, there were occasions when Irish and English officers mistook enemy troops for their own, but the Irish made far greater use of firearms, specifically calivers, which were lighter and more man- ageable than the heavier muskets. English infantry had one or two shot for every pikeman whereas Tyrone's formations had a ratio of four, five and even six shot to each pike. Furthermore, the Irish shot and pike wore no armour, saving perhaps a helmet, whereas English pike were encumbered with armour; possibly 25lbs to 30lbs of steel plate. English infantry marched and fought in dense square or oblong formations called battalia, where pikes formed the core surround- ed by their shot. However, Tyrone's men fought in loose order. The earl's shot engaged in protracted skirmishes with crown forces, while their pikemen protected them from attack by the English cavalry. Only when Irish gunfire had disordered English units did Tyrone commit his pike and swordsmen to turn panic into a bloody rout. The new Irish infantry was a hybrid, which emphasised the firepower of continental tactics while maintaining the operational and tactical mobility of traditional Irish forces. They could move quickly over rough ground, easily outmanoeuvring the more cum- bersome crown forces, whose infantry often remained trapped on roads and trackways. Tyrone's infantry reforms recognised the limitations imposed on pike and shot formations by the Irish landscape. Broken ground, bogs, and woods inhibited close-order manoeuvre, therefore the Irish infantry deployed in loose order, enabling tactical fluidity, which made the English columns they engaged appear lumbering in comparison. Though battles and sieges tend to get the most print, wars are not just about killing people. Indeed the reasons for victory are frequently found off the battlefield. The best-trained and equipped troops are useless if they are in the wrong place, poorly fed or misdirected by badly informed orders. Tyrone built a confederation of Irish lords that was unprecedented and his network of alliances grew as the conflict spread. The confederation stretched from the north coast of Antrim to the rocky inlets of Cork and Kerry. Moreover, the alliance was responsive to Tyrone's will. The earl developed a high degree of operational synchronisation across dif- ferent theatres. Attacks in one region were ordered to displace the crown's military assets, granting advantages to confederate forces in others. Tyrone's attacks on Armagh in 1596-7 had the sole intent of drawing English forces out of Connacht, opening the door to Red Hugh O'Donnell's punishing raids. Faced with inter-regional co-operation the crown struggled to find an adequate response. The nature of the military operations by Tyrone caused many to interpret the war as one of hit-and-run attacks consistent with guerrilla warfare. This conjures an image of unequal opponents, as the weak and militarily crude natives attempt to resist their power- ful and technologically superior enemy. For the Nine Years War, this could not be less appropriate. During the first seven years of the A recreation of the earl of Tyrone's shot. Photo courtesy of Dave Swift of Claíomh, www.claiomh.ie Tyrone used fortifications to block English advances. On 15 July 1597, Lord Deputy Burgh assaulted and took the earl's fort on the River Blackwater, Co. Tyrone. Photo courtesy of Trinity College Dublin, MS 1209/34. Hugh O'Neill, 2nd Earl of Tyrone. Charles Blount, 8th Baron Mountjoy

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