An Cosantóir

www.military.ie THE DEFENCE FORCES MAGAZINE | 29 war, the Irish held the field or forced the English forces to break contact, for most major engagements. After the Battle of the Yellow Ford (1598) the 2,000 survivors of the English relief force only made their way south from Armagh because Tyrone al- lowed them; not exactly hit- and-run warfare. Large Irish units were broken up into smaller groups that engaged in small-scale partisan warfare and raiding, but the irregular actions were often in support of wider military goals. Moreover, the small-unit actions usually depended on the deployment of large regular formations for decisive results. The focus on combat throughout the histori- ography of the war led many to believe Tyrone fought a defensive war. It is true that from 1594-5, Tyrone consolidated his position in Ulster, but while there was a shooting war in the west, Tyrone aggres- sively suppressed English allies in east Ulster. In 1596 while the crown's officers fought it out in Ulster, Ty- rone used raiding to spread Irish political domination into Connacht, the mid- lands and south Leinster. After the resounding defeat of Sir Henry Bagenal's army at the Battle of the Yellow Ford in August 1598, it only took the entry of a small confederate force into Munster in October to overthrow the Eng- lish plantation in a matter of days. By 1600 Tyrone's confederation dominated most of the country, and the crown held little beyond its fortified towns and few key forts. Deception, ceasefires and dissembling negotiations were all used to the advantage of Tyrone's Irish confederates. The war was not just fought with weapons; cessations (as they were known) were by no means peace. Tyrone often requested ceasefires, either for a matter of days or sometimes much more; the longest lasted nine months. Truces forced crown armies to exhaust their supplies for no gain. Tyrone exploited longer cessations to expand his politi- cal alliances, resupply troops in the field, and restock stores. Every delay bought time for the arrival of the long-promised Spanish landing force. Meanwhile, the Irish imported weapons and munitions from merchants (mercantile greed often trumped notions of loyalty to the crown) in Scotland and even England. Im- ported arms and munitions were fed into a system of supply and logistics, which ensured Tyrone's troops were fed, armed and paid. Tyrone pushed the crown's authority in Ireland to the point of collapse. For seven years the Irish defied all English efforts to bring them to heel, and had all but won the war by1600. However, in February 1600 everything changed with the arrival of Charles Blount, eighth Baron Mountjoy as lord deputy. Mountjoy brought a change in attitude that appreciated the Irish threat for what it was; a modernised and sophisticated military and political entity. Mountjoy took his time to reform the demor- alised English army, adopting many of Tyrone's infantry reforms, after which he started to roll back the advances of the Irish con- federates. Within a year Munster was pacified without fighting a single battle, and Sir Henry Docwra landed on the River Foyle with 4,000 troops, causing local Irish lords to defect, thereby threaten- ing Tyrone and O'Donnell's heartlands. Tyrone was on the back foot by the summer of 1601 and the arrival of the Spanish at Kinsale in September appeared to be the lifeline the Irish needed to recover their position. However, it was a false dawn. Obliged to march the length of Ireland to relieve the besieged Spaniards, Tyrone's confederate army was shattered by Mountjoy at the Battle of Kinsale. The war dragged on through 1602 and into 1603, visiting unprecedented levels of devastation, atrocity and human suffering throughout Ireland. Tyrone finally submitted at Mellifont Abbey on 30 March 1603. The fall of Tyrone's confederation was so rapid it disconcerted some English officers, who thought it was another of the earl's ruses to play for time, but the collapse was real. Moreover, the de- feat served to confirm in some observers (and later historians) that Tyrone's success was an aberration, and that the noble yet primi- tive Irish were again easily defeated once England got serious. As in most things, the reality was far more nuanced and complicated than the neat 'Irish primitive' narrative allowed for. Issues concern- ing the nature of power and loyalty within the Irish confederation, systems of supply and logistics, the rapidity of change and the de- pendence of the Irish on firepower all worked to undermine Tyrone. Furthermore, Mountjoy's transformation of the English war effort, modification of military strategy and tactics, and exploitation of English naval and economic power, combined to strengthen the crown and weaken the Irish position. Ultimately, Tyrone's defeat in 1603 completed the English conquest of Ireland. About the Author: Dr James O'Neill was born in Belfast; he worked in the field of contract archaeology for 16 years, before considering a career in history. Gaining a first class BA in modern history at Queens University Belfast in 2007. He gained an MA at QUB in 2009 and PhD again from QUB in 2013. He is the author of The Nine Years War, 1593-1603: O'Neill, Mountjoy and the Military Revolution, published by Four Courts Press in 2017 (ISBN: 978-1846827549). Drawing of Enish Loughan Fort, Co. Antrim, circa 1602 by Richard Bartlett. Photo: National Library of Ireland, MS 2656. The Battle of the Ford of the Biscuits, 7th August 1594. 1: Irish shot engage and halt the head of the column but are eventually forced to give ground by a determined pike charge. 2: Shot envelop the flanks, forcing in Duke's loose shot and disordering his pikemen. 3: Irish pikemen and Scots charge into the disordered rear forcing it onto the main battle and then the van. 4: Duke's army makes it to low ground. Under fire from the surrounding heights, he attacks south but is rebuffed and forced to cross further upstream. 5: Incongruously the Irish horse played no part in the battle.

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