An Cosantóir

An Cosantóir Dec 2019/Jan 2020 www.dfmagazine.ie 40 | BY JOSEPH EA CONNELL JNR H owever spontaneous and idealistic it may appear, guer- rilla warfare can be understood as a science, calling for objectivity on the part of its practitioners, and giving guerrilla struggles a tendency towards universality. But, as with most guerrilla wars, and certainly the few successful ones, the Irish tactics, techniques and procedures in the 1919-1921 War of Independence do not appear to have been part of a plan deliber- ately contrived and constructed in advance. All wars are unique but guerrilla wars have similarities, and suc- cessful fighters learn to use the best strategies and tactics from the last wars to fight the next war 1 . The Irish learned from the past, and guerrilla fighters who followed learned from the Irish. When insurgents succeed it is worth sitting up and paying very close attention 2 . Colin Gray put it thus: 'One should not suggest that the judge- ments drawn from the Irish war can serve as a general paradigm or template for the conduct of all insurgencies that followed, but when those judgements are reviewed and translated into 'lessons' it is tempting to suggest that if one understands the belligerents in the course of, and the outcome to, the Irish war, then one has the lessons to learn for the conduct of future insurgencies or counterin- surgencies.' 3 The 'how to' requires an examination of what worked and what didn't. For example, both sides in the War of Independence used coercion, and resorted to terror: murder, executions, or extra-ju- dicial killings. Such actions on the part of the insurgents deterred others, but more importantly provoked official and unofficial reprisals by the British; exactly what Michael Collins wanted. It makes no sense to iso- late such actions from the record of the war, as they were integral to it and its results. The war in Ireland presents an interest- ing variation of what is now called 'com- pound war theory', and as a result is relevant far beyond its histori- cal interest. In an age of world- wide communications and a pervasive media, with conflicts often muddied by conflict- ing moral and ethical claims, it is difficult for a democracy to wage a counterinsurgency campaign. Politicians and soldiers would do well to examine the Anglo-Irish struggle to identify the traps that ensnared both sides and eventually led to a British withdrawal. Often, military actions required to quell an insurgency will provide the insurgents with the other elements needed to ensure success, such as a lack of political will on the part of the larger forces, and the effects of propaganda on that political will. In reality, the purpose of the IRA was not so much to defeat the British army as to force Britain to negotiate a settlement based on the Irish claim to independence. Lessons learned from the Anglo-Irish conflict worked for the Special Operations Executive in World War II, were of limited value in Malaya, inspired the Israelis in their war of independence, and were used heavily by Che Guevara in Cuba. All warriors must improvise and adapt, and guer- rilla warriors more so than most. Later revolutionaries sought to learn from the Irish experience what to do and not do, what to avoid, what is possible, probable and profitable, and how to exploit their opponent. Historian Max Boot elaborated: 'In the 21st century we've become used to ragtag rebels beating military su- perpowers. Armed with little more than the will to carry out shocking acts of terrorism and the savvy to cultivate General Michael Collins Troops of the British Occupation Forces watch over Dublin City during the War of Independence, 1920.

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