An Cosantóir

www.military.ie THE DEFENCE FORCES MAGAZINE | 41 worldwide sympathy through the media, the little guy has come out on top more often than you'd expect. The paradigms are the 1962 French defeat in Algeria, America's 1975 withdrawal from Viet- nam, and Russia's disaster in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The United States was similarly dealt defeats in Beirut in 1983 and in Somalia in 1993. It almost happened in Iraq—and may yet happen in Afghanistan. What few remember is that the script followed by groups as diverse as the Vietcong and the Taliban was written in Ireland during its 1919– 1921 War of Indepen- dence, the first successful revolt against the British Empire since the creation of the United States of America.' 4 In retrospect, it is clear that Collins and the Irish leaders realised that the three-cornered approach of military action, politics, and propaganda, all aug- mented by intelligence, was required to achieve victory. It was this realisation that led to the campaign that culmi- nated in the Truce of July 1921. Charles Townshend wrote: 'The means were dictated by circum- stance. Slender resources created the style of warfare, rather than a conviction that it held a real hope of success.' 5 While deeply conscious of the sufferings of the Irish, Collins realised that these harsh guerrilla tactics must continue. With few men and little ammunition, he knew he couldn't beat the British by force, but he could defeat them through their retalia- tory conduct and the political pressure the resulting propaganda brought to bear. A series of favourable circumstances (mass imprisonments, the threat of conscription, British overreaction and reprisals, and international opinion, among others) contributed to the Irish be- ing able to control the course of the war. The possibilities quickly became evident and ensured that guerilla warfare could be utilised to the full. Florence O'Donoghue summarised: 'The seeds of all subsequent growth and expansion would appear to be contained in the vital decision not to repeat the pattern of earlier risings, not to commit the national destiny in that day to the hazard of a single blow.' 6 The Irish nationalists of 1919-1921 took little account of the history of British rule, but rather the fact of British rule. In 1920, Richard Dawson wrote: 'Our nationalism is not founded upon grievances. We are not opposed to English misgovernment, but to English government in Ireland. Here, then, we are face to face with an abiding principle of insurgency. Evil memories may be transient, withered by time or effaced by gratitude, but hatred of a fact per- sists so long as the fact continues.' 7 Ultimately, the Irish strategy was based on the fundamental principal that superior political will, properly employed, could defeat a greater economic and military power. Collins and the Irish organised to ensure political rather than military success. The strategic function of the Irish guerilla war was to defeat the British psychologically and politically. As the ultimate pragmatist, Collins realised that since he could not win a military campaign, his prime mission was to keep the IRA vital and active. He had to prevent the restoration of order and he sought to keep the IRA's military forays going until the British government decided that it had had enough of the violent disorder in Ireland, and the nega- tive publicity that entailed. Collins did not seek an unattainable military victory, but a dignified British withdrawal. Learning to adjust is key to success in any insurgency, and the Irish adjusted and improvised their military and political strate- gies better than the British. Bernard Fall, one of the most respected writers on guerrilla warfare of the 20th century wrote that 'A government which is losing an insurgency is not being outfought – it is being out-gov- erned.' 8 The British did not govern Ireland well. The Irish did not 'win' the war – but they succeeded by defeating British political will. The British never learned that the more force you use in counterinsurgency action, the less effective you are, whereas Col- lins recognised that the war would not be won militarily; the IRA would play an important role, but it would not be decisive. The Irish War of Independence demonstrated that given some favourable circumstances an insurrection has a fair chance of success. About the Author: Joseph EA Connell Jnr is the author of Dublin Rising 1916 and Who's who in the Dublin Rising 1916, published in 2016 by Wordwell. He writes a regular column in History Ireland and is a regular contributor to Newstalk's Talking His- tory programme. His latest book The Shadow War: Michael Collins and the politics of violence, published by Eastwood Books in November 2019, is reviewed elsewhere in this issue. 1 Denning, Major BC, MC. 'Modern Problems of Guerilla Warfare', Army Quarterly, (January, 1927). 2 Silke, Andrew. 'Ferocious Times: The IRA, the RIC, and Britain's Failure in 1919-1921', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol XXVII, Issue 3, (19 April 2016). 3 Gray, Colin S. 'The Anglo-Irish War 1919-1921: Lessons from an Irregular Conflict', Comparative Strategy, Vol. XXVI, Issue 5, (8 January 2008). 4 Max Boot Kick the Bully: Michael Collins launches the War of Independence www.historynet.com/kick-the-bully-michael-collins-launches-the-1921-irish-rebellion.htm 5 Townshend, Charles. 'The Irish Republican Army and the development of guerilla warfare, 1916-1921', The English Historical Review, Vol. XCIV, No. 371, (April 1979). 6 O'Donoghue, Florence. 'Guerilla Warfare in Ireland', An Cosantoir, (1963). 7 Dawson, Richard. Red, Terror and Green, p 151. 8 Fall, Bernard. 'The Theory and Practice of Counterinsurgency', Naval War College Review, (April 1965). See Kilcullen, David. 'Counterinsurgency Redux', opinion paper of Kilcullen, Chief Strategist in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. State Department, Washington D.C. (undated). Armed Auxiliaries standing in Beresford Place at the Custom House observing an out-of-shot incident. Possibly the burning of the Custom House. Photo courtesy of South Dublin Libraries/wm_ AD002

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