An Cosantóir

www.military.ie THE DEFENCE FORCES MAGAZINE | 21 Operations (DPKO) argued that a minimum force of 11,000 would be required for effective protection of refugees and security for their return home. A further 600 police personnel would be required for security within refugee camps. According, however, to the UN Secretary General, the situation on the ground meant that 'the condi- tions for an effective UN peacekeeping operation do not, therefore, seem to be in place as of the time of writing of the present report'. This reflected the absence of a ceasefire and any substantive political process. In February 2007 the UN returned to the region and now suggested the installation of up to 16,000 troops in eastern Chad. This was in turn rejected by Chad's President, fearful that such a UN force would constrain his ability to prosecute his proxy conflict with Sudan and to deal with Sudanese-based Chadian rebels. The Darfur crisis became a significant issue in the French presiden- tial election in 2006 – not least through the effective political mo- bilisation of a number of Non- Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Several presidential candidates – including the two final candidates - signed the pledge of 'Urgence Darfur', an umbrella NGO to address the crisis immediately on election. The new French President, Nikolas Sarkozy, moved swiftly on this pledge to prioritise a response to the Darfur crisis, launching a vigorous multilateral diplomatic effort to engage the UN and EU and appointing leading Socialist personality and NGO activist Bernard Kouchner (who had also co-founded Mé- decins Sans Frontières (MSF) as his foreign minister (Marchal 2009; Weissman 2010). The first fruit of French effort was a paper in May 2007 seeking EU consultations on options for an international humanitarian mission. On 10 June bilateral talks between France and the Chad Govern- ment agreed in principle on an international mission and noted the potential role of the EU in such an operation. Déby's support for an EU as opposed to UN intervention appears to have been predicated on his assumption that the central French role in such a force would buttress his position. Kouchner's efforts to announce an EU role 'in principle' were roundly rejected by the German EU Council presidency and reflected profound reservations in both Berlin and London as well as a general reluctance in many other capitals. Germany, the United Kingdom (UK) and others ultimately conceded the point and it was agreed in July that an EU Operational Plan would be finalised in October. The options paper drawn up in July identified France as the framework nation for the operation but identified no substantial roles for either Germany or the UK. As framework nation France was entitled to hold operational com- mand or field command, but not both. Prioritising field command, the operational command was thus available to another contributing EU partner. Swedish interest in the mission initially suggested that the 1,500-strong Swedish-led EU battlegroup, which was then on stand- by for deployment, might be utilised and that therefore a Swedish officer might undertake operational command. However, following a regional visit by Foreign Minister Carl Bildt – and reports of a bitter disagreement over human rights between Bildt and Chad's President Déby, the Swedes either decided against engagement (Dijkstra 2010) or Déby vetoed the idea of a Swedish commander. In either event, a Swedish command role was no longer on the table in August follow- ing that meeting. Meanwhile, both the EU and UN were attempting to finalise details of their respective, interlocking operations. An EU study visit to Chad and the Central African Republic in August brought Council Secretariat and Commission officials together to look at policy, planning, logistical and intelligence issues. For its part, the overall UN mission concept was revised to provide that the Sudan/ Chad border was to be excluded from the operational area of both MINURCAT and EUFOR and that policing of the refugee camps was to be removed from UN to local Chadian command and control with UN support and training. On 25 September 2007 UNSCR 1778 defined the UN's MINURCAT twelve month mission as being to facilitate the re- turn of refugees and internally displaced persons, to support Chadian police training and engage in human rights monitoring and authoris- ing an EU military support mission. For its part, the EU Council agreed in October on a Joint Action to deploy four battalions alongside the UN operation and to provide a bridging function to a possible follow-on UN mission at the end of the MINURCAT mandate. From the EU side this was to have a strict 12 month duration from the declaration of initial operating capacity (IOC). This duration was stipulated by the EU, with the UN envisaging only a 'mid-term joint review' with a view to reporting on the pos- sibility of a subsequent UN mission. As a result, the EUFOR operation was the very first to have an end date, as opposed to an end state – significantly complicating operational planning. The EU's mandate for its military operation stipulated its role as protecting endangered civilians – most especially refugees – and facilitating the return of internally displaced persons, improving security for humanitarian aid delivery and protecting UN personnel and operations on the ground.

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