An Cosantóir

www.military.ie THE DEFENCE FORCES MAGAZINE | 23 local and tribal leaders and extensive security patrolling as well as rapid response to specific threats. This entailed over 250 long range patrols of between 10-15 days' duration each as well as nearly 2,500 short range daily patrols. Special Forces and other elements remained on standby as quick reaction forces. Once fully operational, the mission faced engagement with four key sets of stakeholders on the ground which may provide a clearer picture of how issues pertaining to justices were handled – both offi- cially and in terms of actual practice. This engagement, with the Gov- ernment of Chad, with rebel and other armed forces, with NGOs and with the local population, allows us to begin to map this effectively. ENGAGEMENT WITH CHAD GOVERNMENT AND SECURITY FORCES Across multiple elite interviews, it is clear that the EUFOR's engage- ment with the Government of Chad and its security forces was prob- lematic. President Déby agreed to an EU force largely because he felt that such a force would be easier to manage than an exclusively UN operation. He had greater confidence that the central role of France in EUFOR Tchad/RCA would give him a central decision making role and allow him to exploit its engagement as he prosecuted his battle with rebel forces. From the outset, he pressed the EUFOR command- ers – at both operational and field levels, to agree to joint patrols between Chad and EUFOR troops to pursue shared security objec- tives. He assured commanders that Chad troops would provide local knowledge, effective cover and – where necessary – robust interven- tion to fulfil the EUFOR mandate. At operational level, these offers were not taken up with EU commanders insisting that the neutrality of the EU mission was critical to its credibility and success. At field level, however, and with significant pressure from Paris and locally- based French diplomats, joint patrols were ordered by the French Force Commander, formally countermanded from EUFOR head- quarters and then reissued locally in writing. This provoked a direct demand from the Operations Commander that unless the orders for joint local Chad-EUFOR patrols were formally countermanded by the French authorities, he would publically resign. Those assurances were delivered and the orders not repeated. Chad security forces were responsible for policing. While it was authorised to intervene in situations where civilians were immedi- ately at risk, EUFOR's overall responsibility was for wide area security, undertaking patrols to demonstrate its presence and to deter criminal activity. Under its status of forces agreement it had no policing role or judicial powers, being unable to conduct investigations of criminal activity or punish guilt parties. In particular, EUFOR had no jurisdiction over what went on inside refugee camps or more informal Internally Displaced Person (IDP) settlement sites with EUFOR personnel allowed to enter camps only unarmed except in extreme circumstances. Even within these narrow parameters, there were tensions with local government officials. In one reported incident in May 2008 the governor of Abeche refused to allow EUFOR even to patrol the town at night (a normal operational role undertaken at the time in other areas) even after an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) staff member was shot two months later. ENGAGEMENT WITH REBELS AND ARMED GROUPS According to senior military interviewees the formal 'centre of grav- ity' of EUFOR was the protection of refugees, ensuring delivery of humanitarian aid and to protect NGOs and UN personnel and infra- structures. What came quickly to be understood on the ground was that the focus of these efforts would not be the larger rebel groups, but rather the wide number of even more informal militia groups which, periodically and according to the wet/dry season, would tem- porarily coalesce into rebel formations. It was these informal, small militia groups that posed the far greater danger both to NGOs and UN personnel as well as local populations. Impoverished young men and boys – sometimes forcibly recruited – were acculturated 'almost as a rite of passage' into violence and theft. NGOs and UN personnel were obvious targets of such efforts as were refugees who had access to resources (food, fuel, healthcare etc.) through the UN-managed and NGO-supported refugee camps. Extensive cultural analysis – by military staff officers – had provided some situational awareness to the incoming EUFOR troops and com- manders of cultural norms and practices, but this had not effectively identified the cycle by which these small armed groups – often operat- ing from one or two armed pickup trucks and self-sustained in the field – would operate snatch and grab criminal activities. Periodically, these units would come together for larger mobile quasi military operations. There were some direct engagements with rebel forces. The June 2008 rebel attack on the town of Goz Beida – the location of the Irish EUFOR base in the central region – was the highest profile of these. The town is 70 km from the border of Sudan's Darfur region and was at the time surrounded by UN refugee camps and IDP encampments with a substantial presence of NGOs. A heavily-armed column of up to 100 rebel vehicles entered the town and for a time, maintained a running engagement with Chad government troops. As they monitored the clash of rebel and government forces, an armoured Irish patrol from the 97th Infantry, received incoming fire and replied in kind. The Irish troops maintained their presence at the camps for Sudanese refugees and displaced Chadians, interposing themselves between their camps and the rebel forces. They were also reported as having actively deterred looters and evacuating nearly 250 humanitarian staff. Medical workers said at least 24 people were hurt in the attack on the town. Government officials later bitterly criticised the EUFOR troops for not assisting Chad troops in repelling the attack. In their summation of EUFOR's impact on rebel groups, the International Crisis Group concluded that 'the presence of European forces has […] obliged players in the Chad conflict to act with greater prudence, because they now feel themselves to be under scrutiny' (International Crisis Group 2009). Certainly, no large rebel opera- tions – on the scale of the 2006 or 2008 efforts – occurred during the EUFOR deployment. Idriss Deby, President of Chad during the EUFOR mission and still President to this day Lieutenant General Pat Nash Officer in Command of the EUFOR mission to Chad from 2007 to 2009

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