An Cosantóir

www.military.ie THE DEFENCE FORCES MAGAZINE | 21 ment that EUFOR defended with some resilience in Brus- sels in the face of significant political pressure. An area of tension, however, was in the field of civil- military cooperation (CIMIC). For some NGOs the 'humani- tarian' nature of the EUFOR operation was problematic in principle and in practice, creating confusion and duplica- tion. NGOs demanded, for example, that EUFOR launch an information campaign, using local languages and radio, to explain the difference between the role of EUFOR and that of NGOs. They also criticised EUFOR's use of white vehicles in some areas and two white helicopters in Goz Beida which, they insisted, potentially blurred the distinc- tion between NGOs and the military. More substantially, there were initial objections to bilateral civilian assistance projects of some EUFOR contingents. These projects (such as building schools, sports facilities and other infrastruc- tures), undertaken with funds earmarked by EU member states, were seen as potentially blurring the lines between humanitarian and military entities. In the end cooperation was secured by agreement that such projects would be complementary to, and coordinated with, existing humani- tarian operations and be focused towards those outside the formal refugee camps and IDP sites. By operation's end, structures had delivered greater security to NGOs and their clients, with monthly CIMIC meetings, weekly security briefings and exchange of se- curity-relevant information and communication channels for requesting EUFOR presence in certain areas at certain times were in place. At the same time, the determination of some NGOs to remain distanced from EUFOR were re- spected with agreement that EUFOR would not visit some NGO compounds (Feichtinger and Hainzl 2011). ENGAGEMENT WITH LOCAL POPULATIONS EUFOR's intent with respect to providing security to local populations was differentiated by varying security priori- ties in the regions of its operational area. In the north, Polish and Croatian troops' primary role became the inter- diction of rebel forces (formal and informal) from refugee camps. The goal here was to stop rebel recruitment and interference within the refugee camps. In the central sec- tor, French, Irish, Dutch and Slovenian troops were focused on interposing themselves between vulnerable popula- tions (local and NGO) and rebels travelling across tradi- tional routes from the Sudanese border. In the south sector (Central African Republic) the deterrence of Sudanese tribal militias from attacking local populations was key (author's interview, 2017). Of course the policing issue was critical across all sectors and here EUFOR's perceived performance was problem- atic. The 300-strong UN MINURCAT operation had been tasked with police training and local security with EUFOR providing a wider security umbrella. Six months into the operation, MINURCAT had not yet deployed any of the promised 850 police officers and had managed to train less than half of that number. Critically, EUFOR was not mandated to enter refugee camps - other than in extremis. While they could respond to incidents of criminality that happened in their presence, they had no ability to conduct investigations or to pursue arrests Multiple NGO reports insisted that the security situation within the formal refugee camps and more informal IDP encampments was poor with domestic violence, theft, extortion and banditry ongoing issues. With channels of communication open to most NGOs, EUFOR had success in ensuring local populations had Mass is conducted on Christmas day within the camp berm www.military.ie THE DEFENCE FORCES MAGAZINE | 21

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