An Cosantóir

An Cosantóir July/August 2020

An Cosantóir the official magazine of the Irish Defence Forces and Reserve Defence Forces.

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An Cosantóir July / August 2020 www.dfmagazine.ie 22 | access to incoming humanitarian supplies. Frequent and increasingly far reaching patrols of the primary humanitarian routes and vulnerable areas had a powerful deterrent effect on bandits. Moreover, the presence of EUFOR troops was re- ported to have had an impact on Chadian national army and gendarmerie forces resulting in more professional behaviour. Oxfam reported that 'EUFOR has made many civilians feel safer through its activities, which include patrolling known dangerous routes, destroying unexploded ordnance, making contact with local leaders, and positioning itself defensively around civilians during rebel and government fighting'. Another success claimed by senior EUFOR commanders and reflected in reports on the ground, was in the area of gender. The Operation Commander had made a point of seeking out gender advisors to the operation and placing them in the core Command Group meetings. While this generated antip- athy on the part of some senior male officers he insisted that this was 'very important within CSDP and EU policy and (em- blematic of) where we are coming from'. The role of the two consecutive Swedish officers so assigned was to implement European obligations under UNSCR 1325 for the protection of women and girls' human rights in conflict areas, to increase women's participation on peacebuilding and reconstruction and to increase numbers of females participating on interna- tional security and peace making operations. EUFOR issued gender guidelines and addressed gender issues within operational planning. This included a focus on the training and pre-training of incoming EUFOR troops and in disseminating information on EUFOR to target populations. One of the critical issues identified early on in the operation was that close liaison with traditional tribal leaderships was not connecting with local women. This was identified as a major problem and was addressed by the assignment of female French Muslim troops to the EUFOR operation. They were tasked in theatre of engaging directly with local women and advising them of EUFOR's role and responsibilities. This generated significant and adverse politi- cal opposition from some countries for undermining local cultural norms. In sum, the perception of greater safety contributed to a positive local assessment of EUFOR's impact. In interviews conducted by Oxfam with IDPs and refugees in Goz Beida, for example, people spoke positively of EUFOR's engagement in protecting civilians and said that they personally felt safer with the arrival of EUFOR, feeling reassured by military patrols and asking for an extension in both the frequency and range of such patrols. Of particular note was the role played by the operation's three Level Two military hospitals (two French and one Italian) and associated medevac capacity. Over the course of the operation more than 3,000 local patients were seen and 65 major surgeries conducted. In all interviews conducted, mention was made of informal and non-mandated medical assistance provided to local populations. HANDOVER TO MINURCAT II AND OPERATION CLOSE The EU-UN handover at the conclusion of EUFOR Tchad/ RCA was problematic at a number of different levels and was rooted in the failure to agree on a follow-up mission at the outset of the EUFOR 'bridging operation'. The Opera- tions Commander repeatedly complained that the 'bridge' was being built from one bank of the river without any clear identification of what it was being built towards. This meant that an end date – rather than an end state – to the opera- tion left many critical questions unanswered until very late in EUFOR's mandate. Thus, the final handover to the UN was late, confused and failed to build on the limited security suc- cesses which the EUFOR operation had managed to achieve. The delays in MINURCAT training and deployment of the 850 police officers in the refugee and IDP camps – as well as the effective absence of state authority across much of EUFOR's area of operations – meant that insecurity for the civilian population remained a critical issue throughout. Camp Ciara as seen from above An Cosantóir July / August 2020 www.dfmagazine.ie 22 |

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