An Cosantóir

| 25 www.military.ie THE DEFENCE FORCES MAGAZINE countries, dominates security assessments in Europe. However, Russia's growing closeness to North Korea and some of the more volatile African countries gives Putin extra weapons and resources, which can replace what he loses in the continuing war in the Ukraine. Russia can intensify the conflict for longer periods of time, and widen its reach across Europe even if decisive victories seem out of reach. China, an enigmatic player on the world's stage appears to be increasing its diplomatic and economic engagement in world affairs, especially in Africa and the Gulf States. At the same time, it is edging closer and closer to border excursions with its neighbours, India and Bhutan. India and China have long standing territorial disputes that occasionally flare up into conflict. Additionally, China's Belt and Road Initiative has strengthened relations with Pakistan, an alliance that China is using to thwart India's entry as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. As tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan, long allies, edge towards outright conflict, it would be foolish to overlook the galvanising effect this could have on a range of jihadist groups. A plethora of trade, defence, and intelligence agreements have tied countries together so that impact in one area often cascades across the other. For Ireland, oversight of EU security and military functions increases the need to understand critical geopolitical patterns. SUB-STATE ACTORS Malevolent sub-state actors operate outside of the traditional mechanisms of state and diplomatic engagement and rely on informal networks for logistics, funding, and operations. Often it only becomes apparent that a group exists when a spectacular terrorist attack or a dramatic spike in intelligence chatter occurs. Sub state actors, like Al Qaeda and Daesh, have been around for over a decade. As attention has focused on Hamas and the Iranian proxies along the arc of resistance, Al Qaeda and Daesh (or ISIS as it is more commonly known) have taken the time to refine their strategies, increase reach across disparate groups, and replenish their supplies. Many sub-state actors operate in a decentralised way, making it more difficult to gather intelligence on size, scale or networks. Terrorism has an extended reach through smaller incidents - stabbings, low level bomb making, vehicles, and lone wolf attackers who are allied to large groups but not controlled by them. DIGITAL SPHERE Innovation and advances in digital technologies have brought many benefits, but from a threat perspective, the ease of access to 3D printing, bio substance dispersal systems, AI, and data harvesting is a concern. The weaponisation of technologies such as AI, drones, or autonomous vehicles gives sub-state actors an enormous arsenal of unpredictable resources that can be deployed in out of theatre operations with minimal risk to operatives. Terrorist groups are highly motivated to seek out technologies that give logistical and tactical advantages. Digital communications, encrypted messaging, and virtual reality in particular have given groups an enormous edge in building vast, undetectable networks in diaspora communities and conducting complex operations at home. Social media platforms, very resistant to legislation and regulation, are critical for radicalising new members. Deepfakes and editing of operations to look like online gaming live streams is bypassing traditional methods of detection and prevention. INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES Political institutions are only as good as the social contract that gives them authority - when that contract weakens, or when the institution separates from the people and from its roots, it becomes less competent at its mission, less able to flex and respond to changing threats or new actors. Public criticism of the UN, NATO, OSCE, and other bodies has grown louder in recent years. Contentious political issues and severe humanitarian crises have revealed existing institutions to be less competent and more divided by internal politics at a time when public trust is at an all-time low. Deploying institutional resources cohesively is more difficult now than in previous decades. UNCERTAIN INTELLIGENCE Geopolitics, technology, and the increase of heavily politicised narratives will impact how defence and security intelligence is conducted. The incoming American president has a notoriously fraught relationship with the USA's intelligence agencies and security protocols, often publicly going against them when meeting leaders such as Putin or Kim Yong Un. For Ireland, and for other US allies this complicates intelligence sharing protocols, credibility of intelligence, and requirements for safeguarding national intelligence. Open source intelligence, the particular needs of commercial companies involved in Irish infrastructure and maritime projects that impact national security, and corporate espionage add another layer of complexity to traditional intelligence approaches. Penetrative operations by Russia, China, Iran and others who see Ireland as the gateway into Europe are a new feature, one at odds with Ireland's open, neutral culture and can include bots and social media disinformation campaigns as well as old fashioned Humint. As Gen Clancy takes up the leadership of the EU Military Committee, the Irish government is also reassessing defence and intelligence decision-making. It is a cliché, now to say, the world is more complicated. But, like many clichés there is a grain of truth in it. Simmering conflicts are exploding, extra state and sub state groups are as powerful and resourced as nation states, global narratives are polarised, and geopolitics is once again a critical driver in statecraft. A deeper understanding of the threat landscape is crucial for operational and intelligence planning as Ireland's role in the world shifts to meet the challenges. Dr Mariyam Hasham has over a decade of experience in geopolitical analysis and terrorism studies, first at the Royal Institute of International Affairs and later at the Royal United Services Institute where she helped set up and lead the Homeland Security and Resilience Studies Unit. At the UN Tribunal for Rwanda, she profiled death squads behind the genocide. In the commercial sector, she has worked as a geopolitical analyst for the energy and technology sectors, specialising in the design and build of bespoke intelligence systems. She was one of three on a major UK project - Project Unicorn- which assessed London's ability to withstand catastrophic terrorist attack. Her PhD, from Kings College Department of War Studies, was on the role of identity narratives and terrorism in the IRA. She is currently researching and writing her first book on terrorism and developing data visualisation systems for terrorism, geopolitics and conflict, and emerging threat groups.

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