An Cosantóir

www.military.ie the defence forces magazine | 29 the Balkan League and went to war with the Ottoman Empire to expand their territories, winning comfort- ably and reducing the empire's borders in Europe to roughly those of modern Turkey. The Second Balkan War, which broke out in 1913 when Bulgaria fell out with its former allies over a terri- torial dispute, led to a vastly reduced Bulgaria and an enlarged and ambi- tious Serbia. The result of the two Balkan wars was an increase in tensions, particularly between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, who saw the rise of Greater Serbia as a threat to the unity of its own disparate empire and to Bosnia, with its large ethnic Serb minority. Nationalism wasn't confined to the new nations of Europe, however, and yellow journalism and bombas- tic politicians throughout the conti- nent whipped up jingoism and fed their populations' paranoia about the threats posed by their neighbours. Germany's rapid expansion of its military capabilities, particularly at sea, also led to an arms race with Great Britain, which had the world's most powerful navy, and severely damaged relations between the two countries. Enveloping all of these contributory factors like a suf- focating blanket was an almost universal belief in the inevitability of war; a sense that a war was needed to tidy up all these contentious issues and rebalance the power structures in a much-changed political and economic landscape. Each of the protagonists also felt they had something to gain from a war. France stood to regain Alsace-Lor- raine, the loss of which in the Franco-Prussian War still rankled deeply. A defeat for Germany would remove the threat to Britain's economic and maritime dominance, while a German victory would establish the relatively new nation's position as the major continental power and establish a new order. A Russian victory would restore the prestige lost through the Russo-Japanese War (1904/5) and by the defeat and humiliating treatment of its ally Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War. An Austro-Hungarian victory over Serbia would consolidate the empire's posi- tion and reduce the threat from its Slavic neighbour, while a victory for Serbia would allow for the creation of a yugoslav (Southern Slav) state dominated by Serbia. For most of the major powers' politicians and military leaders of the time, then, it was the classic question of 'Not if, but when?' Looking back with hindsight informed by the utter devastation of the Great War, the horrors of the Second World War, and the threat of nuclear annihilation posed by the Cold War, it is difficult to see war in the same way as it was viewed by the majority of people used to set- piece encounters, usually with nothing much greater at risk than a bit of territory, some national prestige and the limited military forces employed in the field. Even the majority of military thinkers, particularly the older ones who had most influence, failed to realise the degree to which the incredible increases in industrial technology and capacity, allied to equally advancing means of transportation and communication, meant that all bets were off: War was about to enter the modern age with a cataclysmic bang. Next month we will look at the aftermath of the assassi- nation of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and we will address the question: Even if war was inevitable, was it inevi- table that it would be fought the way it was? Battle of Broodseynde [sic] Ridge. Troops moving up at eventide - men of a Yorkshire regiment on the march (Western Front in 1916). Photo by the first official British war photographer 2/Lt Ernest Brooks. Photo courtesy of the National Library of Scotland, and used under a Creative Commons License. Archduke Franz Ferdinand Tsar Nicholas II Painting depicting Bulgarian infantry assaulting the Ottoman lines at Kirklareli during the first Balkan war (1912-1913).

• Cover